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TURNING FROM TORT TO
ADMINISTRATION
Richard A. Nagareda*
Settlements of tort suits ordinarily do not make front-page
headlines. Two recent efforts to effect class action settlements for
workers exposed to asbestos products1 and recipients of silicone gel
breast implants2 are hardly ordinary, however, just as asbestos and
breast implants are not the subjects of ordinary tort suits. Instead,
litigation over these products exemplifies the phenomenon of mass
torts: it involves conduct alleged to be tortious and to affect large
numbers of people by means qf a mass-marketed product - in particular, a product thought to give rise to recurring patterns of injury
that may remain latent for years or even decades.3
The notion that tort claims might be resolved through settlement agreements is not new. The recent settlement agreements,
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B. 1985, Stanford; J.D.
1988, University of Chicago. - Ed. During the period 1991-94, the author was an associate
with the law firm of Shea & Gardner, which represented the Center for Claims Resolution in
the Georgine asbestos settlement discussed herein. The Center is a nonprofit organization
that coordinates the legal representation of some 20 companies formerly involved in the asbestos industry. The author did not take part personally in the Georgine proceedings, however, and the views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Center. A grant
from the University of Georgia School of Law provided financial support for this paper.
John Duffy, Anne Dupre, Robert Hillman, Paul Kurtz, John McGinnis, John Mills, Mark
Movsesian, Alex Passantino, Michael Wells, Christen Wheeler, and Rebecca White provided
helpful comments.
1. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994). This litigation
originally was styled as Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc. As described in greater detail infra,
the settlement approved by the court in Georgine reaches product liability claims of persons
occupationally exposed to asbestos products from any of the 20 companies collectively represented by the Center for Claims Resolution. The settlement does not affect other members
of the asbestos industry, such as Johns-Manville. Moreover, the settlement is limited to occupationally exposed persons who had not sued yet in tort as of January 15, 1993, the date on
which the settling parties submitted their agreement to the court, see Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at
257; the agreement accordingly does not reach pending claims already on file at that time in
any forum. For ease of reference, I cite throughout this paper not only to the pertinent page
of the Georgine opinion but also, when possible, to the relevant numbered paragraph
thereof.
2. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Corning
Corp.), No. CV92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) [hereinafter Lindsey {Sept. 1, 1994)].
3. The same description applies to earlier mass torts, involving such products as the defoliant Agent Orange and the drug Bendectin. I use the locution "alleged to be" and similar
language to clarify that at least some mass tort settlements may come at a time when issues of
medical causation - whether the product in question actually caused injury under a preponderance standard - remain unresolved. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
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however, are visionary in their substance. Each seeks to replace
traditional tort litigation with a private administrative framework.
Their goal is to provide timely compensation to mass tort plaintiffs
by way of streamlined claim procedures while affording defendants
greater certainty as to their potential tort liabilities. Repose, however, does not come cheaply. For defendants, the cost of a mass
tort settlement can run into the billions of dollars.4 On the plaintiffs' side, moreover, timely compensation entails the relinquishment of the right to sue in the common law tort system.
To bring about such a resolution, the recent settlements use the
class action device in an unprecedented fashion. They are unlike
conventional class action lawsuits in which settlement comes in the
aftermath of discovery and other preparations for trial. Instead,
class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have served simply as the procedural device to embody the
settlement in a judgment that will bind future claimants - namely,
persons exposed to the product in question but who have yet to
suffer any ill effects.5 Specifically, class members who do not affirmatively opt out of the recent settlements as contemplated in
Rule 23(b)(3) will be bound to the compensation terms set forth
therein, at least for the duration of those agreements.
Although both of the settlements garnered approval at the district court level, their ultimate operation remains in the offing.
Challenges to the asbestos settlement are likely to wind their way
through the appellate courts for some time. In the case of the
breast implant settlement, an unexpectedly high number of claims
led to the demise of the original deal, which had posited a fixed sum
for the payment of all compensation claims. Although renegotiation efforts have produced a second agreement that covers some
manufacturers, the largest of them -Dow Corning - recently declared bankruptcy, with the result that tort claims against it are unlikely to be resolved soon in any manner. 6 Commentators
4. In its original form, the breast implant settlement entailed the commitment of over
$4.2 billion by manufacturers toward compensation of product users. See Lindsey (Sept. 1,
1994), supra note 2, at *l.
5. Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a class action may be maintained upon a judicial finding
that "questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3); cf. infra section III.C.2.a (discussing potential obstacles to class certification). Subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) of Rule 23, in tum, afford members of the plaintiff class the opportunity to remove themselves - to opt out - from a (b)(3) class action.
6. See supra notes 1-2 (citing district court opinions approving the settlements for fairness). A collateral challenge to the jurisdiction of the Georgine court and to its certification
of the plaintiff class is currently pending before the Third Circuit. See Georgine v. Amchem
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nonetheless have been quick to recognize that, whatever the ultimate fate of these particular settlement agreements, the two stand
as models for the future of mass torts. The transformation from
tort to administration envisioned by such agreements involves what
Peter Schuck has described aptly as "institutional evolutionism":
the ad hoc, experimental development of alternatives to traditional
tort litigation for the treatment of mass torts.7 The notion is not to
tinker at the margins with the common law tort system but, instead,
to conceive of new institutions for whole categories of mass tort
actions. As Judge Jack Weinstein recently has observed,
"[n]onlitigation settlements giving effective help to those who think
they have been injured, without destroying those believed to be at
fault, are the wave of the future." 8 Indeed, with the increased attention devoted to such subjects as the Norplant contraceptive, nicotine in tobacco products, and repetitive stress injuries,9 the
potential field for application of mass tort settlements continues to
expand rapidly.
That mass tort settlements have the potential to affect the lives
and livelihoods of many on an unprecedented scale is indisputable.
The principal architects of these settlements, however, have not
Prods., Inc., Nos. 94-1925 et al. (3d Cir. filed Sept. 22, 1994); infra section III.C.2. In addition, direct appeal of the district court's fairness detennination in Georgine remains to be
had. On the problems leading to renegotiation of the breast implant settlement, see Barry
Meier, A Judge and a Deadline: The Breast Implant Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995, at AB;
Barry Meier, 3 Makers of Breast Implants Offer a Revised Settlement, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3,
1995, at Al, A9 [hereinafter Meier, Revised Settlement]. Although Dow Coming has declared bankruptcy, see Barnaby J. Feder, Dow Corning In Bankruptcy Over Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 1995, at Al, D6, its solvent parent - Dow Chemical - remains the subject
of active litigation with respect to breast implants, see Barry Meier, Dow Chemical Must Pay
$10 Million in Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at A8 (describing punitive damage verdict in individual tort action based upon, inter alia, the performance by Dow Chemical of
studies on silicone for Dow Coming); see also Alison Frankel, Dow Corning Goes For Broke,
AM. LAw., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 78-83; Barry Meier, Dow Chemical in the Center of a Storm,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. l, 1995, at C2.
7. See Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 941, 944 (1995).
8. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JumCE IN MAss TORT LmGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLAss ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OnmR MULTIPARTY DEVICES 4 (1995); see also
Gina Kolata, 3 Companies in Landmark Accord on Lawsuits Over Breast Implants, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994, at Al, BlO [hereinafter Kolata, Landmark Accord] (quoting observation of Geoffrey Miller that breast implant settlement. will "be a model for future class-action
litigation").
9. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Will the Lawyers Kill Off Norplant?, N.Y. TIMEs, May 28, 1995,
§ 3, at 1 (describing tort liability issues surrounding the safety of Norplant); see also Castano
v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La.) (certifying class action against tobacco
industry on behalf of all nicotine addicted persons in the United States), appeal docketed, No.
95-00117 (5th Cir. May 25, 1995); Steve Lohr, Vigorous Defense Stalls Injury Claims On
Repetitive Strain, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1995, at 27 (noting that defendants have thus far succeeded in rebuffing suits for repetitive stress injuries).
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been the courts, legislatures, or public administrative agencies,
much less the legal academy. Instead, the key players have been
private attorneys whose own entrepreneurial incentives potentially
could conflict with the interests of the plaintiff class that they purport to represent. 10 It is this risk of agency costs - the concern
that class counsel might be faithful to their own pocketbooks but
unfaithful to the plaintiff class - that supports the requirement in
Rule 23(e) that a court must pass upon the fairness of a class action
settlement.11 The idea is that judicial review may substitute for the
direct monitoring of counsel by the client, as is typical in traditional
litigation on behalf of an individual plaintiff.
My objective here is to challenge the notion that the recent mass
tort settlements - for all their novel qualities in the mass tort area
- are truly sui generis in the law. Rather, I contend that the rise of
such settlements in tort mirrors the development of public administrative agencies earlier in this century - that, in both instances,
powerful new institutions emerged outside preexisting channels of
control to wield significant power over human lives and resources.
I argue that courts usefully may draw upon familiar doctrines of
judicial review in administrative law to form a conceptual framework for their analysis of mass tort settlements under Rule 23(e).
In other words, not only should the law turn from tort to administration in terms of the compensation system for mass tort plaintiffs,
it also should make a similar shift in perspective when it comes to
10. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alterna·
tive Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 1587, 1620
(1995) (remarking that, in creating the recent mass tort settlements, "plaintiff and defense
attorneys clearly have taken control of the dispute resolution process").
Scholarship on entrepreneurial litigation by plaintiff class counsel has its roots in the context of corporate and securities litigation. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plain·
tiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee,
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney]; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of En·
trepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role].
As discussed infra, these commentators recently have extended their respective analyses to
mass tort settlements. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars]; John C.
Coffee, Jr., Summary, The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion,
80 CORNELL L. REv. 851 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment, A
Market Approach to Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 909 (1995) [hereinafter
Macey & Miller, Market Approach].
11. The requirement of judicial approval extends to class actions generally, not merely to
those involving mass torts. The case for judicial review of settlements in the mass tort area is
especially strong, however, given the sweeping effect of such agreements. See infra section
11.B (discussing the reasons for divergence between the interests of class counsel in a mass
tort settlement and the interests of class members).
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judicial review. Such an administrative perspective is not without
its own limitations, however, and recognition of those constraints
may point the way toward an agenda for further developments in
public law.
In Part I, I set forth the distinctive characteristics of mass torts
and their implications for the economic structure of the mass tort
bar. I then relate the recent mass tort settlements to developments
during the 1980s, from the recognition of innovative theories of tort
liability and damages to the use of statistical methods to facilitate
the disposition, in aggregate, of large numbers of tort actions. The
recent settlements represent an attempt to overcome the inadequacies of these earlier innovations. Although there remains some degree of variation, one may discern an emerging pattern of attributes
for mass tort settlements, and I enumerate them with attention to
their institutional advantages and the prospects for their future application. Readers already familiar with the history of mass tort litigation and the structure of the recent settlements simply may
peruse this Part.
Next, in Part II, I explore the implications of the class action
device for judicial review of mass tort settlements. Specifically, I
detail the need for review to safeguard the fairness of such settlements in the face of the agency cost problems engendered by the
entrepreneurial incentives of class counsel. As I discuss, these
problems stem from the possibility that counsel for the plaintiff
class may wish to "reinvest" the fees gained from the class representation in the development of some new, uncharted field of mass
tort litigation.
In Part III, I explain how doctrines developed for judicial review
of rulemaking by public administrative agencies form a coherent
framework for judicial review of mass tort settlements under Rule
23(e). Specifically, the courts should conceive of such review along
the lines of the "hard look" doctrine, which demands that administrative agencies provide reasoned explanations for their actions in
light of criticism from interested parties received through a noticeand-comment process. Indeed, current law contains the rudimentary elements of such a system, albeit without recognition of its administrative law roots.
I demonstrate how this administrative perspective responds to
the major problems that other commentators - principally, Professor John Coffee - have identified with respect to the recent mass
tort settlements. In Professor Coffee's view, the courts should develop what amount to rigid, per se rules for the structure of mass
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tort settlements and the selection of class counsel. As I show, that
approach not only stems from erroneous premises regarding the recent settlements but also would represent a misguided and overbroad response to the problem of agency costs.
I then discuss the normative limitations of such an administrative perspective. Although a conception drawn from administrative
law does make for a workable system of judicial review, such a perspective fails to legitimize the sweeping power that private counsel
exercise through such agreements. Public administrative agencies
derive their authority to effect binding regulation by virtue of
rulemaking power delegated from Congress; no one, in contrast,
has delegated comparable power to the mass tort bar. As a result,
unresolved questions continue to surround mass tort settlements regarding the propriety of class certification and the basis for personal
jurisdiction over future claimants within the plaintiff class.
To address this crisis of legitimacy, I offer in Part IV an agenda
for public law - one that would preserve the advantages of private
negotiation over the appropriate compensation terms for mass
torts, but that would draw upon the unique regulatory authority of
government to give binding force to those terms. Such a regime
would not entail the creation of a vast new public bureaucracy.
Rather, Congress should draw upon the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act of 199012 as a model for a statutory framework in which public
administrative agencies would act as the facilitators of private
agreements to resolve mass torts and the courts would continue to
safeguard mass tort plaintiffs against agency costs.
I.

TURNING FROM TORT

A. The Character of Mass Torts
The recent class action settlements do not represent the first effort to deal with the challenges of mass torts, both as a matter of
tort doctrine and as a problem of judicial administration. Rather,
they simply are the latest stage in an ongoing effort to adapt legal
institutions to the distinctive features of this phenomenon. Here, I
discuss these features, with special emphasis upon their implications
for the structure and economic incentives of the mass tort bar.

12. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 {1994).
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1. Breaking the Traditional Mold

The classic tort cases of the common law stem from idiosyncratic events: an errant cricket ball konks Bessie Stone;13 a railway
scale becomes dislodged and strikes Helen Palsgraf when a nearby
passenger drops a bundle of fireworks; 14 waitress Gl~dys Escola
suffers lacerations to her hand from an exploding Coke bottle.15
This is the stuff that introduces budding lawyers to the common law
of tort. However extraordinary the facts of these cases may seem,
their fundamental structure is both relatively simple and typical of
traditional tort litigation: there is a single, identified plaintiff who
claims to be hurt here and now by a specific defendant and the
resolution of the plaintiff's claim - whether she receives damages
and, if so, in what amount - has only an indirect bearing, at best,
upon other pending tort suits.16
Mass torts diverge from this familiar pattern. They characteristically involve large numbers of persons who claim to suffer injuries
that come in recurring patterns. The number of people involved
and the recurring nature of their injuries are interrelated. Both
stem from the uniform character of products in a modem industrial
economy. Where manufacturers have marketed a product on a nationwide basis and that product later proves to be harmful, it is
likely that adverse consequences will occur in patterns, given the
fundamental similarities in human physiology from person to person. Thus, for example, the maladies of persons who inhaled asbestos fibers into their lungs come in a handful of distinctive types.17
Likewise, one readily may place into a few discrete categories the
afflictions that breast implant recipients assert.18
Sheer numbers, however, are not the defining feature of mass
torts. Indeed, commentators use a different term - "mass accident" - to describe tortious conduct that happens to strike large
numbers of people in similar ways. The most familiar torts of this
variety consist of localized disasters associated with some physical
13. Bolton v. Stone, 1951 App. Cas. 850.
14. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
15. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
16. See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TruAr.: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS 6-9 (enlarged ed. 1987) [hereinafter SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL]; Glen 0.
Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REv. 1481, 148788 (1992).
17. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 269 ('ll 51) (E.D. Pa. 1994).
18. See Breast Implant Litigation Settlement Notice at exh. D, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp.), No. CV92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994), at exh. D [hereinafter Lindsey Notice].
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structure: a fire at a particular hotel, the crash of a particular airplane, and the like.19 By contrast, mass torts add two further complications - one temporal, the other geographic.
The physical impairments typically produced by an errant
cricket ball, a falling railway scale, a hotel fire, or a plane crash
become apparent immediately after some discrete event. The consequences of mass torts, however, are insidious in nature: mass
torts do not cause broken bones; instead, they characteristically
produce cancer or nonmalignant conditions that do not strike immediately but develop quietly in the body over an extended period.20 As a result, mass torts characteristically entail a latency
period of many years or even decades between exposure to the
harmful product and the onset of physical impairment.21 To take
but one pertinent illustration, medical experts consider the latency
period for asbestos-related lung cancer to be approximately twelve
years.22 This waiting period gives rise to a macabre lottery: only
some of those exposed to a harmful product ultimately will suffer
impairment, whereas other exposed persons - perhaps even the
majority - may suffer no impairment at all. In the meantime, however, all those exposed must watch and wait.
Exposed persons are not the only ones who must live with uncertainty. Defendants likewise cannot know the full extent of their
liability because the impairments suffered by exposed persons are
dispersed over time.23 Until the relevant latency periods have run
their course, the defendants' potential liability for damages in tort
remains undetermined. At most, science can assign to exposed persons a relative risk factor - an estimate of the probability that they
eventually will develop cancer, for example, relative to the risk of
19. See David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons
from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REv. 695, 696 n.4, 716-17 (1989); see also WEINSTEIN, supra
note 8, at 16-17.
20. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 91 HARV. L. REV. 851, 852, 919 (1984).
21. I use the term "impairment" in a medical sense to refer to a clinically verifiable diminution in some bodily function - for instance, a reduction in lung capacity in a worker
exposed to asbestos. "Impairment" thus is distinct from the legal concept of "injury." Tort
plaintiffs may be regarded as injured in a legal sense based upon their exposure to a harmful
substance, even though they have yet to suffer - and may never suffer - impairment. See
infra note 113 (explaining that exposure alone may constitute injury in fact for purposes of
standing).
22. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 275 (q[ 83) (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(approving use of 12-year latency period as criterion for compensation under asbestos settlement agreement).
23. See Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 722-23.
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that disease in an unexposed person.24 Even those who initially suffer some degree of physical impairment may find that their condition worsens over time.
As if temporal dispersion were not enough of a problem, mass
tort plaintiffs also are dispersed geographically.25 The focus of litigation is not upon a particular place but, instead, upon the defendants' distribution of products throughout the national economy.
Litigation against mass tortfeasors thus proceeds in both the federal
courts and various state courts, in jurisdictions with generous juries
and those without.
The large number of claimants, temporal dispersion, and geographic dispersion make for a devastating combination for the judicial system. The potential result is that thousands of individual
lawsuits may proceed over the span of many years in many different
fora, leading to lengthy delays. The asbestos litigation provides the
most vivid and well-documented illustration of these problems, with
plaintiffs having to wait nearly three years, on average, for resolution of their individual actions in tort.2 6
In the meantime, the recurring patterns that these individual
claims exhibit lead, over time,· to a kind of stock market. As
Deborah Hensler and Mark Peterson have observed, the values of
individual claims arising from a mass tort are interdependent:
"[C]laims are so similar that the prospective value of many claims
will rise or fall sharply with a large plaintiff award, a defense verdict
or even a signal discovery event or evidentiary decision in a single
case that is part of the mass of pending claims."27 The implications
of such a stock market become clear when one considers the mechanism by which mass tort claims are brought into the tort system for
adjudication.
24. See Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of
Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181, 234-37 (1993).
25. See Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 721-22.
26. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 279 ('l[ 105).
27. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 967 (1993); see also Coffee, Class
Wars, supra note 10, at 1359; Hensler, supra note 10, at 1596. Thus, for example, the value of
mass tort claims remains intimately linked to the debate in evidence law over the appropriate
standards for admission of expert scientific testimony on novel theories of causation. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (rejecting the view that
admissibility of expert scientific testimony depends exclusively upon its acceptance within the
scientific community); Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 2 (1995) (noting that Daubert "forces to the forefront ... the
problem of how to satisfactorily dispose of lawsuits involving thousands of plaintiffs in the
face of genuine scientific uncertainty regarding the toxicity or safety of the litigated substance
or product").
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The Mass Tort Bar

On the plaintiffs' side, contingent fee arrangements have long
served as the underwriting device for tort litigation.28 The effect, of
course, is to give plaintiffs' counsel a direct economic stake in the
amount of compensation ultimately recovered by their clients.29
For the plaintiffs' bar,30 a successful mass tort claim - like any
other tort action - turns upon proof of the familiar common law
elements of duty, breach, causation, and damage. The first element
is, by now, straightforward and essentially costless for a plaintiffs'
law firm. Mass tort litigation typically stems from the contention
that the defendants failed to warn persons exposed to their product
of some hidden health risk about which the defendants knew or, at
the very least, should have known. Workers, for example, point to
the asbestos industry's failure to warn them about the risk of
asbestos-related disease.31 Breast implant recipients allege that
manufacturers failed to disclose their product's potential to cause
autoimmune disorders. 32 In the aftermath of the products liability
revolution, there can be no doubt of the legal obligation to warn of
such risks.33

s.

28. See JAMES KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, Cosrs AND COMPENSATION PAID IN
ToRT LmoATION 96 tbl. (1986) (showing that 96% of individual plaintiffs in tort litigation
paid counsel on a contingent fee basis).
29. See Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1125 (1970).
30. I use the term "plaintiffs' bar" to refer to law firms in the business of representing
mass tort plaintiffs. That a given firm should ally itself with one particular side in case after
case stems from at least two factors: the ethical limitations upon the representation of clients
with conflicting interests, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1992),
and the economies of scale in mass tort litigation, see infra notes 34-50 and accompanying
text.
31. The leading case to recognize a duty to warn in the asbestos context remains Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974). For a sample complaint centered upon the failure to warn and drafted by a leading
asbestos litigator, see FREDERICK M. BARON, HANDLING OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CASES
§ 8.14, at <J(<Jl 17-20 (rev. ed. 1989).
32. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 992-98 (discussing trials in early breast
implant cases).
33. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes strict liability upon the
seller of any product "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1964). Comment j to the same section
clarifies that a defective condition may arise from the absence of a warning about unobvious
health risks when the seller "has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed
human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of ••• the danger." Id. § 402A cmt. j; see
also 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 32:1 (3d ed. 1993) (same). The wisdom of
such a standard of liability is a subject beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes,
I take as given the principles of product liability law that underlie the claims of mass tort
plaintiffs.
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Beyond the finding of a legal duty, however, the building of a
winning case becomes more difficult. Counsel must develop what
one might call "generic assets" on the elements of breach and causation and "specific assets" in the form of clients who have suffered
damage. As the nomenclature suggests, generic assets consist of evidence that can be used repeatedly in all cases involving a particular
product or, at least, a substantial number of such cases. On the
breach element, counsel must prove that a particular defendant
failed to discharge its legal duty to warn - at the very least, by not
disclosing some risk known in the medical literature to be present
in the product34 or perhaps even by affirmatively suppressing information on health risks or by taking part in a civil conspiracy with
other industry members who engaged in such misconduct.35 To
make such a showing, as a practical matter, counsel must engage in
a process of historical re-creation. Specifically, counsel will need to
ascertain the state of the medical literature at the time of the client's exposure - a task likely to involve expert witnesses versed in
the development of medical knowledge in the relevant field over
time - and to determine, through civil discovery, precisely what
the defendants knew about the product and when. Once assembled, however, such information forms a generic asset that can be
deployed in all cases involving the defendant company.
In addition, evidence of general causation is also necessary.
Counsel must be able to show that the product in question is capable of causing injury in at least some individuals,36 and here, again,
the involvement of medical experts will be crucial. Moreover, proof
of causation also may entail what one might call "exposure matching" - the assembly of evidence through civil discovery to show
that a particular plaintiff was exposed to a particular defendant's
wares.37 These efforts are likely to spill over to the cases of other
plaintiffs where a common nexus of exposure exists: proof that one
worker at a given factory was exposed to the asbestos products of a
34. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089 ("[T]he manufacturer is held to the knowledge and skill of
an expert.••• [This] means that at a minimum he must keep abreast of scientific knowledge,
discoveries, and advances and is presumed to know what is imparted thereby.").
35. See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 468-70 (NJ. 1986) (awarding punitive damages for suppression of information on asbestos risks); see also In re North Dakota
Personal Injury Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 1087, 1096-97 (D.N.D. 1990) {finding a civil
conspiracy to suppress information on asbestos risks among members of a trade association).
36. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 {6th Cir. 1988) {distinguishing between general causation and specific causation); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71
MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1227-28 {1987) (same).
37. See GERAID W. BoSToN & M. STUART MADDEN, LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND
Toxic TORTS 403-09 (1994) {discussing problem of indeterminate defendants).
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given supplier, for example, will go a long way toward demonstrating that others at the same site were similarly exposed.
Quite simply, the development of generic assets takes money.
Expert witnesses generally do not work for free - indeed, some
may regard consultation as a major source of income - nor do law
firm associates or paralegals tasked with the heavy lifting of civil
discovery. Given the use of contingent fee arrangements, moreover, counsel will see no financial returns until the first plaintiff receives compensation in tort. In other words, counsel who wish to
blaze a new path of mass tort litigation must incur the fixed costs of
developing generic assets long before they obtain a favorable verdict or settlement. In fact, in order to deal with the cash flow
problems that this phenomenon engenders, counsel in the Agent
Orange litigation entered into a contractual agreement whereby
multiple "investors" from within the plaintiffs' bar shared the bill
for litigation costs.38 A similar arrangement supports current efforts to undertake sweeping discovery against the tobacco industry
concerning the alleged manipulation of nicotine.39
Ultimate recovery in mass tort litigation, moreover, depends
upon proof that the product in question has harmed some particular
individual in some way - namely, that there has been both specific
causation and damage.4 0 Generic assets do counsel no good, in
other words, without specific assets in the form of a client - preferably many clients. As a result, the members of the plaintiffs' bar
who have "invested" to develop a valuable array of generic assets
likely will be eager to maximize their return by searching for additional clients with colorable mass tort claims. The goal is to spread
the fixed costs of generic assets over ever more units and, in so
doing, to take advantage of economies of scale.41
38. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1987} (describ·
ing agreement whereby six passive investors contributed $200,000 each "as a means of raising
the capital necessary for the maintenance and continuation of the lawsuit").
39. See Glenn Collins, A Tobacco Case's Legal Buccaneers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1995, at
Dl ("Close to 60 prominent law firms known for so-called toxic torts are contributing
$100,000 each to a consortium, filling an annual war chest of nearly $6 million.").
40. See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1200 (Upon proof of general causation, "it became the responsibility of each individual plaintiff to show that his or her specific injuries or damages
were proximately caused by ingestion or otherwise using the [water contaminated by defend·
ants]. We cannot emphasize this point strongly enough because generalized proofs will not
suffice to prove individual damages.").
41. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 1045. This is not to say, of course, that
lawyers ordinarily have no incentive to drum up new business. One of the primary objectives
of any litigation practice is the development of a body of expertise in a particular area that
will lead, in tum, to future business. The point here is simply that the nature of generic assets
in mass torts makes them especially transferable from one case to another - much more so
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What little public information exists on mass tort plaintiffs' law
firms tends to support these predictions from economics. The precise financial structure of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar remains
shrouded in secrecy; law firms, after all, do not publish annual reports in the manner of publicly held corporations. There, nonetheless, is some public information. For example, through lengthy civil
discovery, one of the pioneers in the asbestos litigation - Ronald
Motley of the Barnwell, South Carolina firm of Ness, Motley,
Loadholt, Richardson & Poole - succeeded in accumulating devastating evidence against the asbestos industry on the elements of
breach and general causation. Upon doing so, Motley reached out
to develop ties to other plaintiffs' firms in all fifty states that were
able to come forward with streams of new asbestos clients.42
Specifically, Motley embarked upon the building of what
amount to franchise arrangements: the Ness, Motley firm would
handle proof of the defendant companies' liability; local firms the suppliers of specific assets - would deal with proof of the particular plaintiffs' exposure histories and injuries; and the two firms
would share the fees from successful claims.43 The ingeniousness of
this arrangement lies in the ability of Ness, Motley to spread the
fixed costs associated with its early development of generic assets
while, at the same time, placing upon local counsel - as the franchisee - much of the marginal cost needed to develop the claims
of individual plaintiffs. Indeed, similar franchise arrangements
have come to be used by Motley's longtime rival within the asbestos
plaintiffs' bar, Frederick Baron of the Dallas law firm of Baron &
Budd.44
These sorts of franchise arrangements are not the only device
for cost spreading available to the mass tort plaintiffs' bar. Rather,
the bar not only may rely upon its own efforts, it also may draw
upon nonlawyer intermediaries such as labor unions and doctors
who have ideological or business interests of their own in assisting
with the identification of potential tort claimants. For example, lathan a generalized expertise in a particular field of litigation - and accentuates the incentive
for cost spreading.
42. See Karen Dillon, Only $1.5 Million a Year, AM. LAWYER, Oct. 1989, at 38, 40-41
(profiling Motley's emergence as the "asbestos king").
43. See id.
44. See Gary Taylor, Outspoken Texan, Baron Establishes Toxic Tort Domain, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1983, at 1, 11 {discussing Baron's use of referrals from other plaintiffs' law
firms after his early success in establishing the liability of asbestos companies). Ironically, as
detailed later, Baron has come to be Motley's fiercest critic in connection with the Georgine
asbestos settlement. See infra section III.B.2.b.ii {analyzing Baron's objections to the
Georgine settlement).
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bor unions joined forces with the plaintiffs' bar to conduct mass
screenings of their members in order to identify new asbestos clients.45 Likewise, at least some doctors have obtained lucrative fees
by diagnosing illnesses in breast implant recipients.46
The distinctive features of mass torts not only influence the economic structure of plaintiffs' law firms, they also have consequences
for the merits of cases brought into the tort system. In a world in
which tort suits are largely one-shot deals, where assets developed
for one case are not readily transferable to another, the rational
strategy for a plaintiffs' law firm is to select those cases that offer
the largest expected recoveries after subtracting litigation costs.47
In the traditional tort world, "good" cases - individuals seriously
harmed by conduct that counsel may readily show to be tortious represent the ideal for the plaintiffs' lawyer. In the parlance of
sports :fishermen, the goal is to keep the big fish for frying and to
throw the little ones back.48
Such a selective approach makes sense for relatively immature
mass torts, where plaintiffs' counsel has incentive to put forward the
most grievously injured and most sympathetic clients as a vehicle
through which to establish favorable precedents on contested issues: for instance, on the details of how specific defendants
breached their duty to warn and on principles of general causation.
Over time, however, areas of successful mass tort litigation become
mature: issues of breach and general causation are disputed less
frequently as the harmful character of the product and the defendants' responsibility therefor become increasingly well established,
and lawsuits tend to focus instead upon individualized questions of
specific causation.49 At this more advanced stage, when the basics
of the defendants' liability have taken root, it should come as no
45. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 1023; Bill Richards & Barry Meier, Widening Horizons: Lawyers Lead Hunt for New Groups ofAsbestos Victims, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,
1987, at 1.
46. See Gina Kolata, A Case ofJustice, or a Total Travesty?, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at
Dl, D5; Gina Kolata & Barry Meier, Implant Lawsuits Create A Medical Rush to Cash In,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al, BB.
47. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 889-91 (discussing economics of conventional tort litigation on behalf of plaintiffs}.
48. For a similar nomenclature describing the divergent strategies pursued by plaintiffs'
law finns, see Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEXAS L. REV.
1821, 1827-32 (1995).
49. The concept of a "mature" mass tort is developed in McGovern, supra note 48, at
1841-43; and Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REv.
659 (1989). Cf. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 263 ('ll 16) (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(noting that, by the mid-1980s, "[t]he fundamental legal theories and liability cases against
various [asbestos] defendants had been established").

February 1996]

Tort to Administration

913

surprise that mass tort pioneers like Motley have put, aside a traditional :fisherman approach in favor of a high-volume, low-margin
strategy explicable largely as a cost-spreading device - an "A&P
approach as opposed to the Bergdorf Goodman approach."50
When the defendants come to look like sitting ducks and when
the cost of presenting additional claims lies simply in the identification of new clients - perhaps with the help of interested intermediaries - the incentive is to bring into the tort system
increasingly marginal claims: not just' those plaintiffs who are the
most seriously impaired but· anyone with a colorable claim for compensation. Though of minimal value on an individual basis, such
claims have the potential to amount, in aggregate, to a significant
vehicle for cost spreading by a plaintiffs' firm laden with fixed costs.
Indeed, apart from their substantive merit, such claims have a nuisance value because the mass tort plaintiffs' bar ultimately can
threaten to put defendants through the burden of trial in thousands
of cases.51
The asbestos litigation offers a striking illustration of this phenomenon. Estimates indicate that pleural cases - claims of persons with minute changes in the tissue of their lungs, as revealed on
x-rays, but who do not currently and who may never suffer impairment of their lung functions - constitute as much as one-half of
newly filed asbestos claims.52 Not surprisingly, as discussed in detail later, the handling of such cases has formed the principal point
of contention between the asbestos plaintiffs' bar and defense
counsel.53
SO. Dillon, supra note 42, at 40 (quoting mass tort plaintiffs' lawyer Stanley Levy's characterization of the Ness, Motley firm); see also Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1365
(contrasting "boutique firms" and "wholesalers").
51. Writing on the economic structure of litigation generally, David Rosenberg and
Steven Shaven describe a scenario "where the plaintiff's case is meritorious but he would still
be unwilling to go to trial because the costs of litigation would exceed the expected judgment." David Rosenberg & Steven Shaven, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their
Nuisance Value, 5 INTL REv. L. & EcoN. 3, 5 (1985). As these commentators demonstrate,
the plaintiff still will find it profitable to file such a suit when the potential defense costs from
a trial exceed the plaintiff's filing costs. From the plaintiff's standpoint, the objective is to
capture these defense costs in the form of a settlement. See id. In the mass tort context, the
ability of plaintiff's counsel to file thousands of such claims, if anything, increases their nuisance value.
52. See Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 393 (1993).
53. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 266 ('ll 32) (noting that treatment of pleural cases formed
a major stumbling block for settlement negotiations); infra sections I.C.2.c (recognizing that a
distinctive feature of mass tort settlements lies in their substitution of noncash benefits, primarily a kind of insurance policy against the risk of future impairment, in lieu of cash compensation for persons who are not presently impaired), III.B.2.b.ii (discussing the difference
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As commentators have long recognized, large corporate defendants in traditional tort litigation have both the incentive and the
:financial resources to wear down plaintiffs through obstructionism.s4 In the mass tort context, the interdependence of claim values
reinforces these preexisting disincentives to settle. Defendants cannot hope to pay settlements in cases of marginal merit in order to
put the whole matter to rest. Instead, given the temporal dispersion
of claims, such action carries the risk of increasing the value of similar claims in the relevant mass tort stock market. And that would
only call forth more effort from plaintiffs' lawyers, at the margin, to
identify such claims. From the defendants' standpoint, then, settlement is attractive only to the extent that it does not merely resolve
pending cases but, in addition, provides assurance that such action
will not result in a deluge of marginal cases.ss
The strategy of mass marketers within the plaintiffs' bar and the
fears of defendants make for a paralyzing combination. Given the
investment necessary to develop generic assets, mass marketers
have an especially powerful economic incentive to bring large numbers of claims into the tort litigation system, including marginal
claims. At the same time, defendants have little incentive to resolve those claims expeditiously, at least in the absence of some
assurance about the future. Indeed, the influx of marginal claims
simply reinforces defendants' fears that any movement in the direction of compromise will spell disaster. In a world in which mass tort
claims are numerous but in which courts are not, this is a prescription for deadlock within the judicial system.
B. Partial Solutions
The challenge that mass torts pose certainly has not gone unnoticed by the courts. Quite the contrary, during the past decade,
courts have sought to accommodate the common law tort system to
some of the distinctive features of mass torts. Specifically, courts
have effected changes in substantive theories of recovery to address
the temporal dispersion of mass tort claims and have experimented
with various techniques for consolidation and aggregation in order
to deal with the sheer volume of claims. Although far from definiin treatment between pleural cases within the Georgine settlement class and pleural cases left
outside of the class).
54. See Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 904-05; infra section I.B.2 (discussing the deployment of such tactics by asbestos defendants in Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649
(E.D. Tex. 1990), appeal argued, No. 93-4452 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 1995)).
55. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 1603.
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tively solving the problem, these changes stand as the intellectual
forerunners of the recent mass tort settlements.
1.

Risk-Based Theories

Courts have developed risk-based theories of liability and damages designed to reconcile traditional tort litigation with the long
latency periods characteristic of mass torts. These risk-based theories, in essence, seek to overcome problems of temporal dispersion
by enabling persons exposed to a harmful product to sue immediately, based simply upon the fact of exposure, without the need to
show the kind of physical impairment that may take years to manifest itself. Specifically, during the 1980s, common law courts recognized actions predicated upon the increased risk of some future
impairment or upon the mental distress occasioned by the involuntary bearing of such risk - often described as "fear of cancer"
claims.5 6 The same era saw the development of the damage remedy
of medical monitoring, whereby defendants could be required to
pay the cost of affording exposed persons ongoing medical care to
facilitate the early detection and treatment of any resulting
impairment.57
Though helpful, risk-based theories remain only partial solutions. First, to guard against a flood of claims based upon the slightest increase in risk, some leading decisions have restricted increased
risk and fear of cancer claims to situations in which the plaintiff can
demonstrate a likelihood of future impairment.58 The effect of this
limitation is to restrict the applicability of these risk-based theories
in the mass tort area, where the increase in risk - though substantial when distributed over large numbers of persons - may not be
so great as to enable an individual plaintiff to satisfy a preponderance standard. Second, in at least some jurisdictions, statutes of
limitation and claim-preclusion principles may combine to induce
an unimpaired plaintiff to sue prematurely on a risk-based theory
56. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1204-06 (6th Cir. 1988);
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413-15 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 478 U.S.
1022 (1986); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 294-97, 305-08 (N.J. 1987).
57. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849-52 (3d Cir. 1990); Potter
v. Firestone 'Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 821-25 (Cal. 1993); Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308-15.
Medical monitoring is useful, of course, only when early detection reduces the risk or severity
of eventual impairment. Cf. U.S. PREVENTIVE SERvs. TASK FoRCE, GumE TO CLINICAL
PREVENTIVE SERVICES: AN ASSESSMENT OF TiiE EFFECTIVENESS OF 169 INTERVENTIONS 6770 (1989) (recommending against medical monitoring for lung cancer on the ground that
early detection does not decrease mortality rates).
58. See, e.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1204-05; Potter, 863 P.2d at 816.
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but then prevent that plaintiff from bringing a subsequent lawsuit in
the event that impairment actually occurs.5 9
The foregoing problems are not intrinsic to risk-based theories.
One could hypothesize a legal system that recognizes such theories
even absent a likelihood of impairment and that eases the interaction between such theories and other legal doctrines. There is,
however, a more fundamental shortcoming of risk-based theories as
a prescription for mass torts: they do nothing to address the sheer
number of claims. Indeed, they exacerbate problems of judicial administration to the extent that they succeed in bringing into the tort
system the claims of asymptomatic persons in addition to those
predicated upon some actual, present-day impairment. Unrestricted recognition of risk-based theories would play neatly into
the incentives for cost spreading by the mass marketers of the plaintiffs' bar. Such firms could spread their fixed costs more quickly by
obtaining compensation for large numbers of claims based upon exposure alone, without having to wait years for some fraction of the
exposed population to manifest impairment. This does not mean
that risk-based theories are necessarily a bad idea. Instead, the
point is that efforts to tinker with liability and damage principles
within the framework of traditional tort litigation are not themselves enough to deal with the challenge that mass torts pose.
Change must come in that framework itself.
2. Judicial Consolidation and Aggregation

In addition to new substantive theories, courts have experimented with procedural mechanisms to address the geographic dispersion of tort claims as well as their daunting numbers.
Consolidation techniques speak to the former problem by seeking
to gather mass tort claims in a single forum. In the case of an insolvent defendant, jurisdictional statutes in bankruptcy provide for the
consolidation of all claims against the debtor in a single federal
court to facilitate an orderly liquidation.60 With respect to solvent
defendants, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL
Panel) has authority to consolidate pending federal lawsuits in a
59. See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances
Litigation, 16 CAL. L. REv. 965, 984-87, 1002 (1988).
60. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 1334 (1994). The bankruptcy context has seen the creation of
administrative compensation schemes for persons injured by the asbestos products of JohnsManville and those harmed by the Dalkon Shield. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d
Cir. 1992), modified on rehg., 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); In re A.H. Robins Co., 85 B.R. 373
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988), affd., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
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single judicial district for purposes of discovery.61 Seeking to build
upon this example, the American Law Institute has recently proposed a system for consolidation of mass tort claims in the federal
system through the mechanism of interdistrict transfers.62
Jurisdictional constraints limit these techniques of consolidation.
Apart from the special case of bankruptcy, consolidation mechanisms like the MDL Panel can reach only litigation within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. As the duty to warn in
tort has long been a creature of common law, federal jurisdiction in
the area is limited to diversity cases. Claims that fail the jurisdictional requirement of complete diversity must proceed in state
court, beyond the reach of the MDL Panel. More fundamentally,
consolidation techniques are only the beginning of a solution, albeit
an important one.63 Even if the courts somehow could gather all
pending litigation - both federal and state - into a single forum,
the question would remain what to do with it once it is there.
One possibility involves judicial aggregation of mass tort claims.
Traditional tort litigation - which tends to treat each lawsuit as a
unique event - may be a costly form of overkill where claims fall
into recurring patterns. Traditional tort litigation may serve a useful role in establishing a baseline for compensation, but such an
elaborate method of dispute resolution need not be used to generalize the results to other, similar cases. Specifically, aggregative techniques can draw upon statistical principles to determine
compensation levels for whole categories of medical conditions
based upon the outcomes of trials in a limited sample of individual
cases.
The leading decision to discuss this technique - Cimino v.
Raymark Industries64 - arose from the consolidation of thousands
of individual asbestos suits brought in the Eastern District of Texas.
In Cimino, several members of the asbestos industry had adopted
what District Judge Parker described as a "fortress mentality," asserting a right to individual trials in each case in order "to repeat61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994).
62. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS § 3.08 (1994). For a survey of this and other proposals for civil procedure refonn in connection with mass torts, see William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial
Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEXAS L. REv.
1529 (1995).
63. As discussed infra, the MDL Panel's consolidation of pending mass tort claims may
facilitate private negotiation. See infra section I.C.1.
64. 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), appeal argued, No. 93-4452 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 1995).
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edly contest . . . every contestable issue involving the same
products, the same warnings, and the same conduct."65 In taldng
this stance, the defense drew support from an earlier appellate decision in the Cimino litigation, in which the Fifth Circuit had reaffirmed a principle from traditional tort litigation: namely, that
defendants must be afforded the opportunity to contest specific issues of causation - whether each particular plaintiff was exposed
to the defendants' products and the extent of each plaintiff's damages - before being held liable.66
Faced with the prospect of individualized trials on exposure and
damages, Judge Parker lamented that, even if he "could somehow
close thirty cases a month, it would take six and one-half years to
try these cases," not to mention the additional claims expected to
be filed in the interim.67 As an alternative to such protracted litigation, Judge Parker conducted two initial phases of a consolidated
trial to resolve, respectively, the defectiveness of the defendants'
products and the extent to which the various work sites in question
involved exposure to each defendant's wares.68 The major innovation took place at the third phase of trial, where Judge Parker divided the consolidated cases into five disease categories based upon
the plaintiffs' asserted injuries. Within each category, a random
sample of cases received full-scale jury trials, whereupon the average verdict for each disease category was deemed to constitute the
damage award for the remaining plaintiffs69 - in effect, mass justice for a mass tort.
The Fifth Circuit has yet to decide whether Judge Parker's
scheme comports with the defendants' right to individualized adjudications of causation and damage. In the meantime, both the validity of the aggregative technique used in Cimino, as a matter of
statistical principles, and its normative implications have received
close attention in the secondary literature.70 In retrospect, however, one may best regard judicial aggregation of the type in Cimino
as a provocative detour on the road to the kinds of privately negoti65. 751 F. Supp. at 651-52.
66. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711-12 (5th Cir. 1990).
67. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 652.
68. See 751 F. Supp. at 653.
69. See 751 F. Supp. at 653.
70. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REv. 561 {1993) (criticizing the nonnative implications of Cimino for positing an arbitrary allocation of the opportunity to have one's case tried
in court); Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Bene·
fits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992)
{defending Cimino on grounds of statistical accuracy).

February 1996]

Tort to Administration

919

ated settlements established more recently for breast implants and
for the asbestos claims covered in Georgine. n
The recent mass tort settlements demonstrate, in essence, that it
is possible to achieve something superior to Judge Parker's aggregative solution without Judge Parker. Rather than depend upon some
statistical sampling from random trials, members of the mass tort
plaintiffs' bar and defense counsel may seek to hammer out mutually acceptable principles for compensation based upon experience
in the relevant stock market for claims. The structure of such settlement agreements, their potential pitfalls, and how courts should
deal with them are the subject of what follows.
C. Mass Tort Settlements
Although the recent settlements for asbestos and breast implants contain some variations, one may discern from those agreements an emerging pattern for mass tort settlements.72 The three
salient features of this pattern concern the impetus and structure of
settlement negotiations, the nature of the compensation system established thereby, and the use of opt-out class actions under Rule
23(b)(3) as the procedural mechanism to give binding effect to the
settlement agreement. In detailing these features, I speak to their
institutional advantages for the treatment of mass torts as well as to
the prospects for application of similar techniques in the future.

1. Settlement Negotiations
The genesis of mass tort settlements does not lie entirely with
private attorneys; rather, consolidation by the MDL Panel has
served as an important mechanism to focus the attention of counsel
on both sides upon the possibility of a solution through private bargaining. The negotiations that produced the Georgine asbestos settlement, for instance, began in the aftermath of consolidation by the
MDL Panel of all asbestos litigation pending throughout the federal
courts.73 Indeed, in so doing, the MDL Panel held out the hope
that its action would serve as "a great opportunity to all participants
who sincerely wish to resolve these asbestos matters fairly and with
71. The cases consolidated in Cimino were pending prior to the settlement in Georgine
and, hence, remain unaffected thereby. See supra note 1.
72. In addition to these two settlements, a third agreement concerns agricultural workers
exposed to the pesticide Galecron. That agreement - though less widely known - also
follows the pattern exhibited by its two, more famous cousins. See Stipulation of Settlement,
Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., No. 94-0647-CB-S (S.D. Ala. Aug. 26, 1994).
73. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.ML. 1991) (selecting the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania as the forum for consolidated proceedings).

920

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 94:899

as little unnecessary expense as possible." 74 Likewise, MDL consolidation of federal breast implant litigation with Judge Sam
Pointer of the Northern District of Alabama led to a process of
private negotiation, facilitated at points by the judge himself.75
Although originally conceived solely to coordinate pretrial proceedings in related federal lawsuits,76 MDL consolidation of mass
tort claims has served as the springboard for more sweeping measures. The idea has not been to coordinate preparations for individual trials but, instead, to alleviate the need for trial. The principal
focus of the recent settlements - indeed, in the case of the
Georgine asbestos agreement, the exclusive focus - has not been
upon pending litigation but, more broadly, upon the creation of private compensation regimes for future mass tort claims. In other
words, although MDL consolidation brought the two sides to the
bargaining table, such consolidation does not limit the reach of the
resulting private negotiations.
Apart from the genesis of negotiations, there has been some
variation in the manner in which particular plaintiffs' counsel have
come to serve as negotiators. Some class counsel may take on this
role as a spinoff from some larger committee of plaintiffs' lawyers.
Upon MDL consolidation of the asbestos litigation, for example, all
of the involved counsel on the plaintiffs' side formed a steering
committee to bargain with their counterparts for the defense.77
These negotiations ultimately ran aground, however, due to disputes within each camp over the acceptability of the other side's
proposals.78 The settlement that ultimately resulted did not reach
all defendants but, instead, only the twenty asbestos companies collectively represented by the Center for Claims Resolution.79 Moreover, their negotiating partners consisted not of the steering
committee as a whole but, instead, the two plaintiffs' law firms that
had originally been selected by their peers as co-leads of the steering committee - namely, the Ness, Motley. firm and the
Philadelphia firm of Greitzer & Locks.so
74. 771 F. Supp. at 424.
75. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L.
1992); Henry Weinstein, When Law, Tragedy Intersect, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1994, at Al,
A28-29 (describing implant settlement negotiations and the role of Judge Pointer therein).
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994) (noting that each of the actions so consolidated "shall
be remanded by the (MDL Panel] at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to
the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated").
77. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246, 265 (i 30) (E.D. Pa. 1994).
78. See 157 F.R.D. at 266 (ii 32-35).
79. See 157 F.R.D. at 266 (i 35).
80. See 157 F.R.D. at 293-94 (ii 178-84).
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Other class counsel may come to the negotiating table as a kind
of judicially selected bargaining unit. In reaching the breast implant settlement, for instance, counsel for the defendant manufacturers bargained with a steering committee selected by Judge
Pointer, consisting of seventeen leading plaintiffs' lawyers involved
in implant litigation.81
The precise way in which particular counsel come to represent
the plaintiff class for purposes of settlement negotiations remains a
subject of controversy, which I address later.82 For present purposes, the main point is that the substantive terms of the recent
mass tort settlements are the handiwork of private attorneys, albeit
brought together through the impetus of MDL consolidation.
2.

Compensation

In terms of their substantive content, the recent mass tort settlements seek, in effect, to replace mass tort litigation with a private
administrative compensation scheme - a kind of miniature administrative agency, if you will. In the Georgine asbestos settlement, a
nonprofit corporation established by the settling defendants will administer the compensation system, subject to oversight by class
counsel and a major labor union.83 The settling parties in the breast
implant settlement took a slightly different approach, providing for
court appointment of an independent claims administrator.84
Under either variation, however, the salient attributes of these systems consist of a compensation "grid," simplification of causation
issues, and an insurance component.
a. The Grid. Much like Judge Parker in Cimino, mass tort settlements divide the claims of the plaintiff class into several distinct
categories that correspond to the medical conditions thought to result from the product in question.8s Indeed, much of the settlement
consists of technical language, like the regulations of public administrative agencies, describing the precise medical evidence that a
81. See Weinstein, supra note 75, at A28.
82. See infra section 111.B.2.b.ii {discussing Georgine negotiations as an illustration of a
holdout problem).
83. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 257 n.3, 267 («Jl 38), 304 (H 235, 240).
84. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 10.
85. For instance, the asbestos settlement establishes four such categories: mesothelioma,
a particularly deadly form of cancer in the lining of the lung; lung cancer; other forms of
cancer; and nonmalignant conditions, such as asbestosis and thickening of the pleural tissue
within the lung, at least when impairment of lung functions results. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D.
at 269 («Jl 51). Similarly, the breast implant settlement established several categories for scleroderma or lupus, connective tissue diseases, and other autoimmune disorders, among several conditions. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 6 (schedule of benefits).
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claimant must present in order to demonstrate the existence of a
specified condition.86 These medical criteria themselves may be the
subject of considerable contention between the two sides.
The creation of disease categories and medical criteria enables
counsel then to focus upon negotiation of compensation amounts
within each category. On this question, there is room for tradeoffs
between specificity and discretion. The breast implant settlement
subdivided each disease category by both severity and the age of
the claimant and then set a fixed compensation amount for each
box of the resulting "grid."87 The asbestos settlement, in contrast,
simply sets a range of payments for each disease category. Claimants who meet the relevant medical criteria can receive the minimum amount with no further questions asked. Alternatively,
claimants may request a more individualized evaluation of their
medical condition and other considerations that bear upon the compensation calculus within the agreed-upon range, including not only
personal characteristics like age and earning capacity but also factors that affect the expected level of their recovery in tort, such as
the forum in which the claimant likely would have sued but for the
binding force of the settlement.88
The generation of a compensation grid is not without limitations. In the absence of trials in a limited sampling of individual
cases, as contemplated in Cimino, there must be some source of
information on appropriate compensation levels for the various diseases. In the asbestos example, such information came into existence after literally years of protracted litigation in the traditional
tort system. Asbestos is, after all, the paradigmatic example of a
mature mass tort89 and, by the time of the Georgine settlement negotiations, a well-developed stock market mechanism had emerged.

86. See Stipulation of Settlement Between the Class of Claimants and Defendants Represented by the Center for Claims Resolution, Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 21-33; Lindsey (Sept. 1,
1994), supra note 2, at exh. E.
87. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 6 (schedule of benefits). The word "grid," by
now, has become the common way in which commentators refer to such a compensation
scheme. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 10, at 1614; Judith Resnik, Procedural Innovations,
Sloshing Over: A Comment on Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty:
The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEXAS L.
REv. 1627, 1633 (1995).
88. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 276-77 (H 91-92). The settlement further provides for a
special panel selected by settling counsel to review a limited number of "extraordinary"
claims - those by persons who believe they warrant compensation beyond the range specified in the settlement See 157 F.R.D. at 276 (q[ 91).
89. See McGovern, supra note 49, at 659.
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As a result, the settling parties could fashion their grid by reference
to historical patterns of settlement.90
The use of historical data on recoveries in tort partakes of a
recent proposal by Glen Robinson and Kenneth Abraham, in which
they envision the development of "claim profiles . . . constructed
from data derived from prior adjudications and settlements in the
same or similar cases."91 Again, the notion is that traditional tort
litigation may be used to set a baseline for compensation, but that
resolution of repetitious claims need not entail such elaborate procedures. The difference, however, is that Robinson and Abraham
speak of the construction of claim profiles by courts, whereas the
recent settlements suggest that the same technique may be used perhaps with greater efficiency - by private attorneys experienced
in the relevant mass tort stock market.
If repetition of the asbestos experience were the only way to
reach a mass tort settlement, such devices would hold only limited
attraction. The background to the breast implant settlement, however, suggests that such is not the case. There, only six individual
cases had been litigated to verdicts in the tort system at the time of
settlement negotiations.92 In preparation for the negotiations, however, the plaintiffs' bar had invested several million dollars toward
the collection and organization of documents bearing upon the defendant manufacturers' knowledge of potential product risks. 93
Their efforts paralleled the Food and Drug Administration's contemporaneous investigation into similar issues in connection with its
moratorium on new implant sales.94
The point is that it does not necessarily take years of protracted
tort litigation to afford an informational baseline for negotiation.
Where experience in the tort system is limited, however, substantial
uncertainty may remain on particular elements of the plaintiffs'
claims. This expands the compensation range over which counsel
must bargain and makes the fashioning of a negotiated compromise
more difficult.
Moreover, regardless of how the compensation grid is created,
its credibility will depend upon the availability of sufficient funds
90.
91.
92.
992.
93.

See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 277 (CJ[ 95).
Robinson & Abraham, supra note 16, at 1491.
See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *2; Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at

See Weinstein, supra note 75, at A26; see also Aaron M. Levine, What Our Committee
Accomplished, WASH. PoST, May 20, 1994, at A24 {letter to the editor).
94. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 994.
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for all who remain in the plaintiff class actually to receive the payments set forth. As discussed in greater detail below,9s this issue
will turn upon the accuracy of settling counsel's projections as to
the number of claims under the settlement - another subject upon
which historical experience in the tort system can be an invaluable
guide. Indeed, inaccuracy in this regard is precisely what led to the
collapse of the breast implant settlement in its original form.
b. Causation. Simplification of causation issues also adds to
the streamlining of the compensation system. A claimant need only
show exposure to a product of one of the settling defendants plus
the existence of a disease that meets the specified medical criteria.
Any remaining uncertainty over general causation is simply factored into the compensation calculus, and evidence of specific causation - proof of a link between the particular claimant's exposure
and her medical condition - typically is not required.96 That defendants in the asbestos settlement should have agreed, in effect, to
concede the existence of causation hardly seems surprising. The
existence of a link between asbestos and a host of diseases is, by
now, virtually indisputable as a general matter,97 so defendants give
up little in the streamlining of causation issues. The same concession can be highly significant, however, for products like breast implants, for which general causation - the issue of whether the
product causes autoimmune disorders in anyone - remains questionable, at best.98
95. See infra section III.B.2.a.
96. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246, 268 ('ll 46) (E.D. Pa. 1994); Lindsey
(Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *5.
97. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1990), appeal argued,
No. 93-4452 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 1995) ("In the real world, the scientific community long ago
resolved the issues that continue to be litigated by the courts. Every institution •.• that has
investigated this remarkable natural mineral has concluded that it is inherently dangerous.").
98. See Gina Kolata, Proof of a Breast Implant Peril is Lacking, Rheumatologists Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1995, at B7 (noting that the American College of Rheumatology has
concluded that "silicone implants expose patients to no demonstrable additional risk for connective tissue or rheumatic disease"). As one reporter has noted:
The most definitive study yet of the health effects of silicone breast implants has failed to
find any association between the implants and connective tissue diseases. The new study
is so compelling and its results so consistent with previous studies that some leading
rheumatologists contend that the issue of whether implants cause these diseases can now
be considered closed.
Gina Kolata, New Study Finds No Link Between Implants and Illness, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
1995, at A18; see Kolata, supra note 46, at DS (noting "the new and growing body of evidence
from seven epidemiological studies, some commissioned by implant makers and some by the
Federal Government, which have consistently failed to find links between implants and
autoimmune diseases"); Gina Kolata, Legal System and Science Come to Differing Conclusions on Silicone, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at C6 (same); see also Marcia Angell, Are Breast
Implants Actually OK?, NEW REPUBuc, Sept. 11, 1995, at 18, 20 (same). But see Feldman,
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The observation that the breast implant agreement reached a
resolution of the causation issue similar to that of the asbestos
agreement belies the complaint raised by John Coffee that mass tort
settlements will tend to come too early in the development cycle of
mass torts, such that the plaintiff class will receive far less than they
might otherwise obtain from a settlement at some later point.99
Time is not always on the plaintiffs' side. For breast implants, the
epidemiological studies completed thus far merely have added to
skepticism over a causal link to autoimmune disorders.
This pattern is by no means unique. In the Agent Orange class
action litigation, defendants agreed to establish a compensation
program for exposed Vietnam veterans, but, when it came time to
adjudicate the individual claims of those veterans who had opted
out of the plaintiff class, the court ultimately rejected their causation case as inadequately grounded in science.100 Likewise, massive
epidemiological data ultimately belied the early success of plaintiffs
in litigation over birth defects allegedly caused by the antinausea
drug Bendectin.101 If anything, these examples support the image
of mass tort settlements as vehicles for genuine compromise by
both plaintiffs and defendants in the face of scientific uncertainty,
with plaintiffs sacrificing their chance at more money in the event of
new causation evidence and defendants surrendering the prospect
of stonewalling until such time, if ever, r, that the scientific evidence
comes to rest squarely on their side.
The potential efficiency gains from such compromises are welldiscussed in the mass tort literature. Specifically, the simplification
of causation and the development of a compensation grid together
carry the promise of substantial reductions in the transaction costs
associated with the transfer of money from defendants to plainsupra note 27, at 25 (questioning the reliability of epidemiological studies thus far completed
regarding implants).
One possible explanation for the willingness of implant manufacturers to enter into a
settlement, notwithstanding the shakiness of the plaintiffs' case on general causation, may lie
in fears that common law juries might be swayed unduly by evidence suggesting that manufacturers operated with a cavalier attitude toward potential health risks - even if such risks
ultimately did not come to pass. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 993-96 (summarizing the results of FDA investigations suggesting that manufacturers may have engaged in
inadequate testing of implants and may have withheld test results that called into question
product safety).
99. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1360.
100. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Llab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
affd., 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
101. See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1993).
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tiffs.102 In the asbestos litigation, for example, only thirty-seven to
thirty-nine percent of the money expended by defendants actually
goes toward compensation of plaintiffs, with the rest being consumed in the transfer process.103 Empirical research in the future
fruitfully might examine whether the recent settlements ultimately
live up to their promise to reduce such deadweight loss.
c. Insurance. Finally, mass tort settlements characteristically
contain an insurance component designed to overcome the temporal dispersion of mass tort claims. Specifically, the recent settlements provide minimal or no immediate cash compensation for
those who have yet to become impaired, but they do afford such
persons the opportunity to obtain compensation if impairment ultimately does result. Most notably, this principle applies to claimants
who initially obtain compensation for a nonmalignant condition but
who later develop cancer.104
In essence, the settlements provide an insurance policy funded
by defendants. They address the phenomenon of temporal dispersion not by struggling to fit all exposed persons into the mold of
traditional tort litigation for immediate injuries but rather by moving outside of that framework to accommodate the flow of claims
over time. The effect is to focus the private compensation scheme
upon those most in need of immediate help.105
3. Binding Effect
The use of streamlined compensation techniques is by no means
unprecedented. Workers' compensation laws have existed for
nearly a century to move entire categories of recurring claims from
the tort litigation system into public administrative regimes. 106
Mass accident cases like the Kansas City Skywalk litigation have
made use of plans to provide quick compensation payments to
102. See Edley & Weiler, supra note 52, at 393.
103. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 263 ('ll 18) (E.D. Pa. 1994).
104. See 157 F.R.D. at 284 (IJI 129); Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *5-*6. The
breast implant settlement, however, does provide for payment of medical costs incurred by
those who choose to have their implants removed, even if they have yet to suffer any ill
effects. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 4-5 (discussing the "explantation" fund).
105. This attribute of the Georgine settlement builds upon earlier efforts to develop socalled pleural registries, whereby asbestos plaintiffs diagnosed with observable changes in the
condition of their lungs but who had yet to suffer impairment of their lung functions could
register with the court and thereby toll the applicable statute of limitations. See Peter
Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POLY. 541 (1992).
106. See WARREN FREEDMAN, THE LAw AND OCCUPATIONAL INJURY, DISEASE, AND
DEATii 8 (1990) (discussing early workers' compensation legislation).
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plaintiffs upon the presentation of minimal supporting evidence.101
In the mass tort area, plans for the distribution of compensation to
mass tort plaintiffs from bankrupt tortfeasors such as JohnsManville and A.H. Robins, the maker of the Dalkon Shield, have
used compensation "grids."108 Moreover, the story of Judge
Weinstein's successful effort to bring to a conclusion protracted
class action litigation over Agent Orange by way of a settlement on
the eve of trial is a mainstay of the mass tort literature.109
The recent mass tort settlements nonetheless depart significantly from these earlier models. As in the case of Agent Orange,
the recent settlements have come as part of class actions under
Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - the socalled opt-out form of class action predicated upon the existence of
legal or factual issues common to the class as a whole.110 This form
of class action is unique among those recognized under Rule 23 in
that class members have the right to exclude themselves from the
action and, thereby, any resulting settlement.111
The definition of the plaintiff class under Rule 23(b)(3) may include both current and future claimants or only the latter. In the
breast implant settlement, the plaintiff class encompassed all persons, including those with pending tort actions, who received their
implants prior to June 1993.112 In contrast, the plaintiff class in the
Georgine asbestos settlement consists of workers exposed on the
job to asbestos products from any of the twenty settling defendants
but who had not sued in the tort system as of the date the settlement was filed.11 3 As I discuss later, this second approach to class
107. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 973.
108. See supra note 87; see also Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative
Comments on Claims Resolution Facilities, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBS., Autumn 1990, at 113.
109. See SawCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 16.
110. See supra note 5. For a discussion of the determination to certify a mass tort settlement class, see infra section 111.C.2.a.
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). The prospect of bankruptcy amongst the settling defendants - and its occurrence after a settlement has been reached, as in the case of Dow
Coming - can be a formidable obstacle to the operation of a mass tort settlement. Mass
tort settlements nonetheless do not entail the use of subsection (b)(l)(B) of Rule 23 for class
actions against a limited fund. I accordingly discuss the future prospects for such agreements
upon the assumption that the settling defendants do not avail themselves of the limited fund
concept. For a stimulating discussion of mass torts in the bankruptcy context, see Thomas A.
Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE LJ. 367 (1994).
112. See Lindsey (Sept. l, 1994), supra note 2, at *79.
113. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 257-58 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The
courts have clarified that exposure to a harmful substance constitutes injury in fact sufficient
to afford standing in federal court to future claimants who have been exposed but remain
presently unimpaired. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437, 1454
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (class of future claimants in Georgine.asbestos settlement); see also In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1434 (2d Cir. 1993) (veterans exposed to
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definition raises special concerns where cases already pending in
the tort system - so-called inventory cases - receive different
compensation terms.114
Unlike the Agent Orange example, however, the recent settlements do not represent the denouement to class action litigation in
the conventional sense. Instead, they use the class action simply to
give binding effect to a settlement reached prior to judicial certification of a plaintiff class under Rule 23. Indeed, the settling parties in
Georgine filed their agreement with the court simultaneously with
the plaintiffs' class action complaint.11s
By embodying the settlement agreement in the form of a judgment rendered in a class action, counsel seek to afford predictability
to defendants. If valid, the judgment will obligate the members of
the plaintiff class - at least those who do not affirmatively opt out
- to pursue their demands for compensation through the settlement regime rather than through individual lawsuits in tort. 116 The
Georgine asbestos settlement has an initial lifespan of ten years,

Agent Orange); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 835-36 (Bankr. E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (persons exposed to asbestos products of Johns-Manville), vacated on other
grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified on rehg., 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993). Numerous
other courts have reached the merits of cases involving exposed-but-unimpaired persons,
without raising any doubt as to standing requirements. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 113 S.
Ct. 2475 (1993) (prisoners exposed to second-hand smoke have cause of action for constitutional tort); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) (PCBs); In re A.H.
Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.) (Dalkon Shield), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989);
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (heart valve), appeal dismissed without opinion, 995 F2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993); In re Fernald Litig., No. C-1-85-149, 1989 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 17764 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 1992) (radiation from uranium processing plant).
114. See infra section III.B2.b.ii.
115. See Georgine, 151 F.R.D. at 257. For jurisdictional purposes, the analogue would be
a consent decree, in which a public administrative agency presents for judicial approval a
prenegotiated settlement reached with a regulated entity in order to provide prospective relief. See Carlough, 834 F. Supp. at 1463-64 (citing authorities). That such a lawsuit constitutes a "case or controversy" sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction under Article III
has long been settled. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 325-26 (1928);
SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1984).
116. The legitimacy of this application of the class action device remains controversial.
As I discuss infra, debate has centered upon whether courts may certify a class under Rule 23
for purposes of settlement when that procedural device would be unwieldy for purposes of
actual litigation. Likewise, uncertainty remains over the basis for personal jurisdiction over
class members. See infra section III.C.2, Part IV (suggesting that Congress may bolster the
legitimacy of mass tort settlements by replacing the class action as their binding mechanism
with a statutory regime that would give effect to such agreements in a manner similar to
negotiated rulemaking by public administrative agencies).
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with future negotiations to cover subsequent periods;117 the breast
implant settlement would have had a thirty-year lifespan.118
Apart from repose for defendants, the use of the class action
mechanism to bind future claimants has implications for both public
awareness and procedural issues. As for the former, the recent settlements have drawn far more attention to their respective subjects
- particularly among members of the general public outside of the
legal profession - than otherwise would have occurred through
protracted litigation in the tort system. To meet the requirement of
Rule 23(c)(2) that class members receive "the best notice practicable under the circumstances" in order for them to exercise their
opt-out rights, the recent mass tort settlements have involved massive efforts to reach exposed persons through individualized mailings, intermediaries such as unions and doctors, and at-large
advertisements in the mass media.119 Indeed, the sheer scope of the
breast implant settlement made it front-page news in the generalinterest press.120 In short, an opt-out class action may well be more
successful than the traditional tort system in placing the story of the
plaintiff class before the public and focusing attention upon possible
tortious conduct.
As for procedural issues, the recent settlements represent a private contractual solution to what otherwise would be unwieldy
problems of judicial consolidation. For instance, settlement
through the medium of Rule 23(b)(3) may bundle together claims
that otherwise would be resistant to consolidation due to the jurisdictional limitations applicable to individual lawsuits. In a class action, there need only be complete diversity between the
representative plaintiffs and all defendants; complete diversity over
the entire plaintiff class is unnecessary. 121 The upshot is that future
claims in state courts that otherwise would escape MDL consolidation now can be reached. This, in essence, is the response of the
recent settlements to the geographic dispersion of mass tort claims.
117. Counsel will renegotiate the compensation grid after the initial 10-year period of the
settlement. Adjustments at that time may be no greater than 20%, and the settlement provides for dispute resolution procedures in the event that negotiations reach an impasse. See
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 277 ('ll 93).
118. See Lindsey (Sept 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *5.
119. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314, 320-23 (E.D. Pa. 1993);
Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 312 ('ll 290); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.
(Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp.), No. CV92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 114580, at *8-*11 (N.D.
Ala. Apr. 1, 1994) [hereinafter Lindsey (Apr. 1, 1994)].
120. See, e.g., Kolata, Landmark Accord, supra note 8, at Al; Henry Weinstein & David
Olmos, $3.75-Billion Settlement of Implant Suits is OKd, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994, at Al.
121. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969).
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It would be a mistake, however, to regard the surmounting of
jurisdictional limitations as a wholly desirable achievement. Those
constraints exist for a purpose, after all - not the least of which is
to command respect for the substantive rights embodied in the
common law of tort in the various states. 122 The prospect of class
members trading away those rights at the instigation of class counsel who may have their own entrepreneurial interests at heart and
who act outside conventional channels of client control does not
exactly leave one with a warm feeling of security. It is awfully hard,
after all, to control an attorney you do not know, who is negotiating
a settlement on your behalf in a class action that may not yet have
appeared on the public docket. These concerns have led to exploration of the possibility that judicial review within the framework of
Rule 23 might serve as a surrogate for client control, and it is to that
enterprise that I next tum.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND AGENCY COSTS

A.

The Framework of Rule 23

The use of Rule 23 as the means to bind the plaintiff class to the
settlement carries with it a requirement of judicial review. Subsection (e) of Rule 23 specifically provides that "[a] class action shall
not be ... compromised without the approval of the court. " 123 To
give content to this requirement, the courts have asked whether a
class action settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate" 124 and
have made use of hearings to receive evidence and argument on
whether this substantive standard has been met. 125
The basic rationale for this judicial inquiry is straightforward: in
traditional litigation amongst private parties, the adequacy of a settlement can safely be left for the parties themselves to assess, with
each knowing what is best for itself and each possessing the ability
to impress its preferences upon counsel. In this regard, the adequacy of a settlement in private litigation is akin to other questions,
such as the adequacy of consideration to support a contract, that
122. See infra section III.C.2.a (discussing choice of law problems).
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
124. Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly, J.) (securities class
action), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); accord, e.g., Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 900
(2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1138 (1986); Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986
(11th Cir. 1984); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 179 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE,
NEWBERG ON Cr.Ass ACTIONS § 11.41, at 11-91 (3d ed. 1992).
125. See 2 NEWBERG & CoNTE, supra note 124, § 11.56.
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the law leaves largely in private hands. 126 The problem in the class
action context is that "the negotiator on the plaintiffs' side, that is,
the lawyer for the class, is potentially an unreliable agent of his
principals."127 This is, in other words, a classic illustration of an
agency cost problem - namely, a situation in which reliance upon
an agent for the exercise of discretion in accordance with some specialized expertise comes only at the cost that the agent, in practice,
may exercise discretion in a manner at odds with his principals'
interests.
Where a settlement concludes active litigation in a class action
format, this traditional justification for judicial review has considerable force, given the sequence in which class certification and settlement occur. Class certification takes place at the early stages of
litigation; in fact, Rule 23(c)(l) calls for the court to determine
whether class certification is warranted "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of [the] action." 128 Absent the rare step of
class decertification at some later stage, the members of a plaintiff
class will become locked into representation by class counsel. By
the time that a settlement comes to fruition, the period within
which to opt out will have long passed, and the court accordingly
must make certain that counsel have not sold out the interests of
the class in the settlement agreement.
Where settlement occurs prior to judicial certification of an optout class, however, the justification for judicial review is less obvious. Where the members of the plaintiff class have the chance to
consider the settlement terms at the same time that they must decide whether to opt out, there initially might seem little justification
for an additional layer of judicial scrutiny under Rule 23(e).
Although there may not have been client control at the time of the
settlement negotiations, there is a degree of control ex post,
through assertion of the right to opt out by the members of the
plaintiff class.
In no instance, however, has a court intimated that the formation of a settlement prior to certification of an opt-out class somehow will suspend the requirement of Rule 23(e) for judicial review
of the settlement terms. That would be difficult to do, given the
126. See Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Natl. Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir.
1987) (Posner, J.).
127. 834 F.2d at 681; see also, e.g., In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 801-03 (3d Cir. 1995); Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney,
supra note 10, at 680.
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l).
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absence of any distinction along such lines in the text of Rule 23(e).
In addition to positive law, moreover, there are sound policy reasons that support judicial review of prenegotiated class action settlements, especially in the mass tort area.
The persistence of judicial review under Rule 23(e) stands as a
tacit recognition that the opt-out mechanism is an imperfect check
upon class counsel. Particularly in the mass tort context, some class
members may not learn of the opportunity to opt out, notwithstanding provision of the "best notice practicable" pursuant to a
multimedia campaign under Rule 23(c)(2). In other words, mass
torts are unlike, say, securities class actions where there typically
are records of who bought what and when; rather, in the absence of
data on exactly who was exposed to the product in question, there
are bound to be at least some members of the plaintiff class who
will remain unknown to class counsel. Depending upon the nature
of the product in question, still others may not themselves be aware
that they are within the class of exposed persons. Simply as a practical matter, then, not all members of the plaintiff class may be able
to engage in ex post ratification of class counsel's handiwork.
More fundamentally, a mass tort settlement effected through
the vehicle of a class action forces the members of the plaintiff class
to choose between the tort system and a private compensation regime. Apart from the representative plaintiffs named in the class
complaint, however, few class members will have agreed to be put
to such a choice. The vast majority of class members do not authorize the negotiations by class counsel in their name; indeed, they
may well be unaware that such negotiations are taking place.
Moreover, by definition, prenegotiated settlements come into being
prior to any judicial determination under Rule 23 that a class action
is even an appropriate procedural vehicle or that those who hold
themselves out as class counsel should be entitled to do so.129 In
this light, one may understand judicial review for fairness under
Rule 23(e) as a means - albeit after the fact - to pass upon the
process by which counsel have put the class of exposed persons to a
choice between tort and administration.
Such review may be particularly valuable given the dynamics
that can arise from the creation of a settlement. As Judge Posner
has observed, "where notice of the class action is ... sent simultaneously with the notice of the settlement itself, the class members are
129. See GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 7frl.
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presented with what looks like a fait accompli."130 The very existence of a multimillion-dollar settlement, in other words, may give
rise to its own momentum, which individual class members may feel
they cannot resist effectively. Again, judicial review over the settlement as a whole may act as a supplement for the imperfections of
ex post review by class members on a person-by-person basis.
B. Agency Costs in Mass Tort Settlements
If courts are to be on the lookout for agency costs in mass tort
settlements, it would be helpful to have a more specific idea of the
reasons why class counsel might accept unfair settlement terms.
The problem of agency costs in the class action context stems from
defendants' indifference between payments to the plaintiff class and
payments to class counsel. When negotiating a settlement in a class
action, counsel for the plaintiff class are in a position to entice defendants to reduce their total payments by providing counsel with
generous fees but affording inadequate compensation to the class.
A controversial recent example in consumer class action litigation is
the phenomenon of so-called scrip settlements, whereby members
of the plaintiff class receive certificates usable only for discounts
toward the purchase of new products from the defendants, but class
counsel receive substantial fees in cash.131
Such scrip settlements clearly would lie beyond the pale in the
mass tort context, but the problem of agency costs may persist in
more subtle forms. As noted earlier, a distinctive feature of mass
tort settlements is an insurance component designed to respond to
the temporal dispersion of claims by providing compensation to
plaintiffs over many years in the future, as their impairments come
to light. This feature of class action settlements in the mass tort
context - arising from the peculiar nature of mass torts themselves
- provides additional prospects for class counsel to earn fees beyond those available in ordinary class action litigation over injuries
confined to the past.
130. Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680-81; see also GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 789.
131. Compare, e.g., GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 768 (overturning district court's approval of class action settlement of breach of warranty claims in which purchasers of GMC
trucks with gas tanks alleged to be susceptible to leakage upon side impact collision would
have received certificates usable only toward purchases of new GMC trucks but class counsel
would have received $9.5 million in fees) with In re Domestic AirTransp. Antitrust Litig., 148
F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (approving settlement of class action against major airlines for
price fixing in which consumers in the plaintiff class received discount coupons for future
flights but class counsel received over $14 million in fees). See Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at Cl (describing controversy surrounding scrip
settlements).
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For class counsel, at least two fee sources exist: fees from the
class action that results in creation of the settlement itself and contingent fees for the representation of compensation claims under
the settlement.132 The appropriate relationship between these two
sorts of fees has yet to receive attention from the courts. What can
be said at this early juncture is that the rationale behind a fee award
for class counsel simply for the creation of a mass tort settlement is
an unwieldy holdover from more traditional uses of the class action
device in other areas of litigation. Where the claims of the plaintiff
class are not temporally dispersed, the compensation described in
the settlement can be paid immediately - to the victims of a pricefixing ring, to those who purchased a security based upon a misleading prospectus, and to the like. There is no need for further stages
of legal representation. Instead, the court can award fees to class
counsel based upon the total pot of damages obtained for the plaintiffs under the theory that counsel have produced a "common pool"
of benefits for the class as a whole, upon calculation of a reasonable
hourly rate for counsel's time under the so-called lodestar method
or some combination thereof.133
The recent mass tort settlements contemplate a fee award to
counsel for the plaintiff class.134 The asbestos settlement leaves the
issue in the lap of the court by providing merely that the settling
defendants agree to pay such fee award to class counsel as the court
shall determine.135 The breast implant settlement was only slightly
more precise: it provided for a judicial determination of fees for
plaintiff class counsel but made such fees payable from funds placed
in a particular account, the size of which was specified in the
settlement.136
After receiving a fee award for the creation of the settlement,
however, class counsel have the opportunity to obtain a second series of fees based upon the filing of individual compensation claims
at later times. Indeed, that is the whole point of the insurance component. Should class counsel wish to remain involved in the subject
area the settlement covers, they will have a major opportunity to
reduce their labor costs under a private administrative compensa132. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1375.
133. On the calculation of class counsel fees in traditional class action litigation, see
Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 10, at 22-23.
134. Defense counsel, of course, do not depend upon an award in order to obtain fees, as
they are compensated by their corporate clients on the basis of hourly rates.
135. See Georgine v. Arnchern Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 285 ('ll 136) (E.D. Pa. 1994).
136. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 9-10.
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tion scheme. Specifically, counsel no longer need employ associates
to represent clients in depositions, conduct settlement negotiations,
appear in court, and undertake other tasks that only attorneys may
perform.137 Instead, they may switch to lower-priced paralegals to
assemble the paperwork necessary to present an administrative
claim for compensation. In this regard, the settlement simply would
accentuate trends already observed in high-volume plaintiffs' law
firms involved in mass tort litigation.138 The settlement presents
class counsel with the opportunity to become a Wal-Mart for legal
services.
The success of such a cost-cutting effort remains somewhat constrained, however, to the extent that the settlement - like the recent ones - would permit compensation claims to be filed on a pro
se basis.139 This, however, is unlikely to make a huge dent in the
market for counsel's services. Although empirical evidence is limited, the experience under the private compensation scheme established in bankruptcy for Dalkon Shield victims suggests that
claimants will continue to make substantial use of lawyers, even for
the filing of administrative compensation claims.140 These results
come as no surprise, given that - for the mass tort plaintiffs' bar it is typically the lawyer who searches for the client rather than vice
versa. 141
A second constraint consists of limitations upon the contingent
fees that class counsel may extract from represented claimants. The
notion here is to adjust for the reduction in the risk to plaintiffs'
counsel that flows from the existence of the settlement. The
Georgine agreement, for example, caps at twenty-five percent the
contingent fees that may be taken from compensation claims - a
reduction from the thirty-three to forty percent typical for asbestos
plaintiffs in the tort litigation system.142 The breast implant settlement would have provided for judicial scrutiny of contingent fees
137. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDucr 466 (1992) (stating that unauthorized practice may include activities that require
knowledge of the law above that of the average lay person, that involve the giving of advice
concerning legal rights, or that customarily are performed by lawyers); CHARI.Es W.
WOLFMAN, MODERN LEGAL Ennes § 15.1.3, at 835-36 (1986) (same).
138. See Dillon, supra note 42, at 42.
139. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 285 (~ 136); Breast Implant Litigation Settlement
Agreement Questions and ~nswers at *24, Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2 .
140. See Georgine M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (Or
Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 617, 654-55 & nn.135-36 (1992).
141. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
142. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 285 (n 136-37).
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for compensation claims and would have taken such fees from the
same separate account as the fees for service as class counsel,143
Finally, the success of a Wal-Mart strategy remains limited by
the prospect that attorneys other than class counsel will seek to
compete for clients in the aftermarket for compensation claims
under the settlement. Class counsel, however, will have a strong
basis upon which to promote themselves as the attorneys with the
most extensive knowledge about the workings of the compensation
regime. Indeed, to the extent that class counsel serve as monitors
for the administration of the settlement, they could become privy to
information about that system that may not be readily available to
other lawyers.144
One might regard the prospect of any attorney obtaining contingent fees in the presence of very little contingency as unsavory at
best.145 The prospect of such fees in the aftermarket for compensation claims, however, does have the salutary effect of aligning the
entrepreneurial interests of class counsel with the interests of the
plaintiff class in maximizing its return under the settlement. The
more compensation there is, the greater the contingent fees for
counsel who represent claimants in the aftermarket.
The existence of two distinct sources of fees has the potential to
play into the economic structure of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar in
more disturbing ways. Although class counsel might want to remain in the subject area of the settlement, lowering their labor costs
in the manner described, an award of fees simply for service as class
counsel raises another tantalizing opportunity. Specifically, counsel
may wish to cut and run - to leave the subject area entirely or, at
least, in significant part. In particular, given the substantial costs
that must be incurred to develop generic assets for budding areas of
mass tort litigation, class counsel simply may want to take the fees
generated from the formation of a settlement in one area and "reinvest" them in some other field of prospective mass tort litigation
where expected returns might be greater over the long run. That
143. See Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 9-10.
144. In approving the Georgine asbestos settlement, for example, the district court expressed concern that class counsel might acquire "inside information" in the course of "fulfilling their monitoring and supervisory duties." Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 304 (1 237). The
court accordingly held out the possibility that it might, in the future, "exercise its power to
appoint additional class counsel who can fulfill the vital monitoring and supervisory responsi·
bilities •.. and who would not represent individual class members who submit claims for
compensation." 157 F.R.D. at 304 ('l! 238).
145. On the prevalence of contingent fees in situations where the risk to counsel is mini·
mal, see Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince
of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29 (1989).
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the fee award for service as class counsel comes in a lump sum and
comes much sooner than the dribble of contingent fees for individual compensation claims over time simply adds to the attraction.
Indeed, this risk is especially pronounced when the settlement covers an area of mature litigation, such as asbestos. Having won one
fight, a pioneering firm might wish to position itself to achieve preeminence in yet another area of mass tort litigation.
That counsel for the plaintiff classes in the asbestos and breast
implant settlements should be at the forefront of other, newly developing areas of mass tort litigation is consistent with this hypothesis. For example, fresh from the Georgine settlement, Ronald
Motley has joined with other plaintiffs' lawyers who have agreed to
contribute toward an annual budget of some six million dollars to
fund class action litigation against the tobacco industry on behalf of
nicotine-addicted persons.146 Another prominent participant in this
consortium of "investors" - Stanley Chesley of Waite, Schneider,
Bayless & Chesley in Cincinnati - served on the plaintiffs' steering
committee that negotiated the breast implant settlement.147 Still
other members of the steering committee, such as Elizabeth
Cabraser of Lieff, Cabraser & Heimann in San Francisco, have appeared on bar programs to explore the prospects for litigation
against the makers of Norplant.148
This is not to say that fees for settlement creation are unwarranted. Where a mass tort settlement provides a more efficient and
secure mechanism to get money into the hands of impaired persons,
those who fashion that mechanism confer real benefit upon the
plaintiff class over and above the compensation dollars that class
members ultimately will receive. The prospect of a fee award for
service as class counsel exacerbates the problem of agency costs,
however, by reducing the correlation between class counsel's entrepreneurial interests and the interests of the plaintiff class in securing fair compensation. The possibility that class counsel might
use their fees for cross-fertilization of mass tort litigation does not
necessarily mean that the plaintiff class will suffer. It does, however, underscore the need for some external monitor to guard
against that possibility.
One response to the foregoing problem might take the form of
new substantive principles for fee awards. Specifically, courts could
146. See Collins, supra note 39, at Dl, D3.
147. See id. at Dl; Lindsey, (Apr. 1, 1994), supra note 119, at *3.
148. See Kolata, supra note 9, at 5. The connection here is that the delivery device used
in the Norplant contraceptive contains silicone.
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explore ways to bring the determination of class counsel's fees into
greater alignment with the distinctive nature of compensation
under a mass tort settlement. To the extent that a settlement
spreads payments to class members over an extended time period
as their impairments arise, so might the fees for service as class
counsel be deferred over time. Not only would this undercut the
phenomenon of an immediate lump sum award that encourages reinvestment elsewhere, it also would tie the financial fate of class
counsel to the workability of the settlement. In awarding fees to
class counsel over time, a court might appropriately take into account whether the settlement has turned out to be a bad deal for
the plaintiff class.
Such an approach would carry risks of its own. Specifically, it
may leave the plaintiffs' bar with insufficient incentives to undertake the time-consuming negotiations necessary to fashion a largescale settlement. The law, however, need not rely exclusively upon
controls that require ongoing judicial supervision of fees. The calculation of fees is, after all, merely a proxy for that which the court
is ultimately concerned with under Rule 23(e) - namely, the substantive fairness of the settlement terms for members of the plaintiff class. In addition to innovative thinking on fee awards, a
complementary system of procedural controls might organize the
way in which the courts review the fairness of mass tort settlement
terms in order to detect the shortchanging of the plaintiff class. The
workings of such a regime and its relationship to developments earlier in this century are the subject to which I now turn.

III. AN ADMINISTRATIVE

PERSPECTIVE ON FAIRNESS

The recent mass tort settlements hold the promise of a more
systematized approach to compensation - one that may overcome
the barriers in traditional litigation to consolidated disposition of
claims in large numbers over time. Yet this promise remains dependant upon an elite group of private attorneys who possess formidable expertise in the subject area and who operate far removed from
the usual channels of client control. Although the recent settlements represent a bold departure in the area of mass torts, the story
of their rise has a curiously familiar ring. This is not the first time in
which innovative new legal institutions have evolved to address
problems that exceeded the capacities of the common law, only to
give rise to new concerns over control. The emergence of private
attorneys as the principal architects of mass tort settlements paral-
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lels, in several salient respects, the rise of public administrative
agencies earlier in this century.
One might say that the Motleys, Chesleys, and Cabrasers of today are, in this sense, the heirs of yesteryear's James Landis, Alfred
Kahn, and Louis Brandeis - the "prophets of regulation" who
oversaw the birth of modern administrative government.149 To be
sure, the former have accumulated power through the innovative some might say diabolical - use of the class action device, whereas
the latter received delegations of power from politically accountable institutions. This distinction is a significant one and forms the
focus of later discussion.15° For present purposes, I simply draw attention to the similarities in the circumstances that led to private
compensation schemes for mass torts and those that underlie their
counterparts in public regulation.
The precise origins of the administrative state remain a subject
of considerable debate among historians, and I do not purport to
settle the: score here. Indeed, one may accept a prescription for
judicial review of mass tort settlements along the lines of administrative law on purely pragmatic grounds - as the most coherent
judicial safeguard against unfair settlement terms - without believing that the two phenomena share comparable- historical roots.
That several striking similarities exist, however, seems beyond
dispute.
In the early years of this century, the rise of large corporate
structures operating on a national scale was as dauntingly new as
the phenomenon of mass torts to the present day. As historian
Stephen Skowronek has put it: "Industrialism, in all its dimensions,
exposed severe limitations in the mode of governmental operations
that had evolved over the nineteenth century . . . . Providing the
national institutional capacities commensurate with the demands of
an industrial society required nothing less than building a different
kind of [governmental] organization."151 Indeed, the familiar economic justifications for regulation of industrial activity - control of
monopoly power, cost internalization to account for externalities,
and the like - flow from this singular historical development.152
149. See THOMAS K. McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984) (profiling these and
other pioneers in public administrative regulation).
150. See infra section III.C.2.
151. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920, at 13 (1982).
152. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982).

940

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 94:899

Lawsuits within the common law system of the nineteenth century provided only slow, sporadic means to achieve these regulatory
ends. Like their present-day descendants in the mass tort area,
common law courts proved institutionally incapable of handling the
large number of recurring cases needed to achieve coherent economic regulation. 153 The problems that industrial activity on a national scale posed, instead, demanded ongoing oversight on a longterm basis.154 The response ultimately was not to tinker with the
common law but to empower new institutions: namely, public administrative agencies acting upon delegations of power from a national Congress.
The evolution of streamlined solutions to regulatory problems
did not stop with the creation of administrative agencies. Over the
course of this century, agencies themselves have moved increasingly
away from ad hoc, individualized adjudications - typically, enforcement proceedings against particular entities - as the primary
means for setting regulatory policy. Instead, with the blessing of
the courts,155 agencies have embraced the procedure of informal
rulemaking, through which they promulgate detailed regulations
that set policy on a prospective basis over a range of conduct.156
Indeed, the shift from retrospective enforcement to prospective
specification of conduct parallels the shift in the recent mass tort
settlements from retrospective adjudication of individual tort claims
to the development of prospective compensation regimes for future
claimants.157
In more recent years, rulemaking by public administrative agencies itself has become a way to dispose of recurring kinds of disputes without the need for repeated adjudication. In Heckler v.
Campbell, 158 for example, the Supreme Court upheld the efforts of
the Social Security Administration (SSA) to curtail sharply the
need for individualized adjudications of disability benefit claims by
153. See BARRY M. MrmlCK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGUIATION 28 (1980).
154. See id. (cataloging the deficiencies of common law principles for purposes of
regulation).
155. That blessing came relatively early, in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947),
where the Supreme Court held that "the choice made between proceeding by general rule or
by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the
administrative agency." 332 U.S. at 203.
156. On the shift from adjudication to informal rulemaking, see Antonin Scalia, Vermont
Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and thi; Supreme Court, 1978 SuP. Cr. REv. 345, 375-82.
157. Cf. MrmlCK, supra note 153, at 31 ("[T]he rise in administrative regulation has seen
a shift from regulation 'after' to regulation 'before,' and has seen a rise in affirmative and
active, as against passive, means of regulation.").
158. 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
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developing a grid through rulemaking procedures.159 Much like the
compensation grids established by the recent mass tort settlements,
the SSA's rule sets forth various recurring combinations of claimant
traits and then specifies the agency's :finding as to the availability of
jobs for such individuals in the national economy - a crucial variable in the agency's ultimate determination of eligibility for disability
benefits.160 Outside the context of government benefits, agencies
have similarly drawn upon rulemaking to reduce the need for individualized adjudication over matters of economic regulation.161
Like the recent mass tort settlements, the modem administrative state comes with the risk that agencies may act in furtherance
of their own bureaucratic agenda rather than in the faithful execution of their statutory mandate - for example, to endear themselves to those they are supposed to regulate or, perhaps, to a
White House with political goals different from those embodied in
regulatory statutes. This risk is simply another manifestation of the
more general problem of agency costs.1 62 In response, the central
enterprise of administrative law has been to develop ways in which
to guard against the arbitrary exercise of agency power without
cramping the agencies' deployment of expertise in pursuit of their
delegated duties - not to put the genie back into the bottle but to
make sure that he does not run amuck. 163 Administrative law thus
may offer an informative perspective to the analogous problems associated with mass tort settlements.

A. Lessons From Administrative Law
Over the last generation, the federal courts have developed
what is by now a well-delineated framework for judicial review of
159. See 461 U.S. at 470.
160. This similarity has not gone unnoticed in the secondary literature. See Edley &
Weiler, supra note 52, at 398 n.27; Robinson & Abraham, supra note 16, at 1500 n.58.
161. See, e.g., FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964) (FPC limitations on certain price
tenns in natural gas contracts); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.192 (1956)
(FCC limitations on multiple ownership of radio and television stations).
162. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L., EcoN. & 0RG. 243, 246-48 (1987).
163. Putting the genie back into the bottle no longer seems an available option. The
Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), upholding the constitutionality of the independent counsel statute, purports to sound the death knell for efforts to
roll back the modern administrative state on separation of powers grounds. The wisdom of
Morrison, however, does remain the subject of lively debate. Compare, e.g., Steven G.
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1153, 1208-15 (1992) (criticizing Morrison' on originalist grounds)
with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1, 106-18 (1994) (defending Morrison on the same grounds).
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rulemaking by administrative agencies. In large part, the current
framework represents the outgrowth of debate during the 1970s
over the role that judges should play in the review of complex regulatory decisions - whether judges themselves should develop technical expertise in order to scrutinize the factual premises of
regulatory actions or, alternatively, whether the comparative lack of
technical expertise on the bench counsels, instead, for a focus upon
the decisionmaking process within the agency. The pointed exchanges in this period between the legendary D.C. Circuit Judges
Harold Leventhal, taking the former view, and David Bazelon, advocating the latter, typified this discussion.164 By and large, it is the
Bazelon view that comes closest to the current state of the law,
although some flickering embers of the Leventhal approach still remain. The prevailing orthodoxy in administrative law is that courts
need not become experts in the technical underpinnings of regulation but, instead, should insist that rulemaking agencies employ a
decisionmaking process that involves the searching and reasoned
consideration of complex regulatory problems.16s
The "hard look" doctrine encapsulates this approach to judicial
review. The notion is that the agency must think seriously about
the plausible approaches that the information at hand might support and then must explain the reasoning behind its selection of a
particular course of action. In this way, courts have given meaning
to the command of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to set
aside agency action that is "arbitrary."166 As one leading source
has put it:
This approach to review of discretion is one that emphasizes process.
The agency ultimately employs discretion to choose among relevant
alternatives not foreclosed by statute. But it must develop fully rele164. Compare Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, J., concurring) with 541 F.2d at 68-69 (Leventhal, J., concurring); Friends of Earth v. Atomic Energy Commn., 485 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (separate statement of Bazelon, J.)
with 485 F.2d at 1034-35 (separate statement of Leventhal, J.).
165. The leading paper to recognize this transformation in perspective remains Richard
B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667
(1975).
166. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). Before asking whether the agency acted arbitrarily,
of course, a reviewing court in administrative law must ascertain whether the agency's action
passes muster under the now-familiar framework of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837 (1984) - specifically, whether the agency acted within the bounds of the rulemaking authority conferred by Congress. The notion is to link agency action to some delegation
of authority from the legislature and, ultimately, to some source of federal regulatory power
in Article I of the Constitution. In the context of mass torts, however, there is no obvious
analogue to Chevron review; no one has delegated to the mass tort bar the authority to effect
settlements of future claims through the vehicle of a class action. The absence of a Chevron
analogue in itself raises significant questions about the legitimacy of mass tort settlements a topic that I explore infra in section III.C.2.
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vant information concerning the effects of these various alternatives
and the relevant considerations and interests involved in choosing
among them. It must also explain and justify the alternative chosen in
light of such information and considerations.167

Where the agency provides such an explanation, the Supreme
Court has noted that "the ultimate standard of review is a narrow
one," such that "[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."16s
The driving force behind this decisionmaking process lies in the
participatory framework established by the APA for informal
rulemaking. Specifically, the agency must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to apprise interested members of the
public of its contemplated course of action.169 The agency then
must afford all interested persons "an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments," and the agency must issue "a concise general statement" of
the "basis and purpose" for its rule in light of these comments.170
In short, the agency must call forth information and arguments that
may undercut the premises of its proposed rule, and the agency
then must address those criticisms.
The Supreme Court's most famous application of hard look review in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. 171 illustrates the point. The litigation
arose from the agency's decision to rescind a rule that would have
mandated the inclusion of passive restraints in new cars of the thencoming model year on the ground that its safety benefits did not
justify its compliance costs to industry.172 The agency took such action after years of wrangling under several different presidents, culminating with the Reagan administration's decision to rescind the
rule as part of its agenda for regulatory relief.173
In State Farm, the Court overturned the agency's action as arbitrary. The Court pointed out that the agency had failed to explain
167. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POUCY 363 (3d ed. 1992).
168. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
169. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994).
170. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994).
171. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
172. See 463 U.S. at 38-39.
173. See 463 U.S. at 34-39 (describing the history of the passive-restraint rule); see also
463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The agency's
changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new President of a
different political party" that considers "public resistance and uncertainties to be more important than [did] ... a previous administration.").
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why it had decided to scrap the passive-restraint rule in its entirety
when studies in the rulemaking record called into question the
safety benefits of only one kind of passive restraint: automatic
seatbelts, which the agency feared would be detached frequently by
drivers. The Court went further, however, to clarify that the hard
look calls not only for simple consideration of such alternatives but
also for an explanation of the factual premises of the agency's action. On this score, the Court observed that - wholly apart from
the possibility of relying upon other kinds of passive restraints, such
as airbags or nondetachable automatic belts - the agency had
failed to explain how the rulemaking record supported the crucial
factual premise upon which it had based its action: namely, the fear
that detachable automatic belts, in fact, would be detached in
droves. 174
The Court underscored that its demand was not for certainty
where none could be had, given that the rule in question had yet to
be implemented in the real world. Rather, the Court clarified that:
Rescission of the passive restraint requirement would not be arbitrary
and capricious simply because there was no evidence in direct support
of the agency's conclusion. It is not infrequent that the available data
do not settle a regulatory issue, and the agency must then exercise its
judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on the record to
a policy conclusion. Recognizing that policymaking in a complex society must account for uncertainty, however, does not imply that it is
sufficient for an agency to merely recite the terms "substantial uncertainty" as a justification for its actions .... [T]he agency must explain
the evidence which is available, and must offer a "rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made." 175

The kind of agency rationality the hard look envisions is not desirable simply for its own sake. Rather, the hard look embodies an
implicit recognition that agencies seldom act arbitrarily in the sense
of determining their course of action by a roll of the dice; instead, in
seeking to advance their own bureaucratic agenda, agencies may
take action that undervalues considerations that Congress meant to
carry weight in administrative decisionmaking. In the underlying
statute at issue in State Farm, for example, "Congress intended
safety to be the pre-eminent factor" in the agency's choice of stan174. The Court observed that the agency itself had accounted for the low rate for usage of
existing manual seatbelts by reference to inertia - the need for drivers to buckle up in order
for manual belts to enhance safety. The Court pointed out, however, that this same factor of
inertia "works in favor of, not against, the use of" automatic seatbelts, which require an
affirmative act on the part of the driver to disable them. 463 U.S. at 54.
175. 463 U.S. at 52 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).
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<lards for automobile design. 176 By examining whether the agency
has offered a "rational connection between the facts found and
choice made," the courts may detect when the agency has skewed
its analysis of information in the rulemaking record in such a way as
to give less weight to "pre-eminent" considerations, such as safety,
and more to other factors, such as the plight of the auto industry.177
Indeed, one may understand the emphasis upon safety in the
rulemaking statute in State Farm as a way for the prevailing political
coalition in Congress to ensure fidelity by the rulemaking agency in short, to "create pressures on [the] agenc[y] that replicate the
political pressures applied when the relevant legislation was enacted" and, in so doing, "to enhance the durability of the bargain
struck among members of the coalition."178 In this way, judicial demands for reasoned decisionmaking serve to guard against precisely
the kinds of infidelities that lie at the core of the agency cost problem in administrative law.
B. Application to Review of Mass Tort Settlements

In evaluating the fairness of a mass tort settlement under Rule
23(e ), courts should draw upon the foregoing framework for judicial review in administrative law. In other words, courts should analyze the creation of private administrative regimes for mass torts in
a manner similar to that already developed for scrutiny of their
public regulatory counterparts. Here, I discuss the operation of
such a system of review, first in a general overview and then with
reference to both particular problems observed in the recent mass
tort settlements and the prescriptions offered by other
commentators.
The sorts of agency cost problems that may arise with respect to
mass tort settlements are amenable to an approach that turns upon
a reasoned explanation of the settlement terms in light of information on the expected results of litigation in the tort system.179 In
particular, judicial review of mass tort settlements should employ a
kind of notice-and-comment process to focus the attention of the
settling parties and ultimately the court upon information that
176. 463 U.S. at 55 (citing the legislative history).
177. 463 U.S. at 52, 55; see Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98
HARV. L. REv. 505, 557 (1985).
178. McCubbins et al., supra note 162, a.t 255; see also Garland, supra note 177, at 586-91
(understanding State Farm as reinforcing norms of agency fidelity).
179. I use the word "expected" in the economic sense of expected value, to encompass an
adjustment for the uncertainty of recovery.
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sheds doubt upon the fairness of the settlement terms. It would be
far more difficult for class counsel to advance their own interests at
the expense of the class if counsel knew that in order to obtain judicial approval they must explain their decisions in light of contrary
information.
1. Overview

Courts already have begun to touch upon the rudiments of such
an approach, but they have done so without apparent recognition of
its pedigree or exploration of its implications. Even before the advent of mass torts, courts confronted with settlements of class actions in more familiar settings - most prominently, corporate,
securities, antitrust, and consumer litigation - spoke of their review for fairness under Rule 23(e) as involving both a "substantive
inquiry into the terms of the settlement relative to the likely rewards of litigation" and a "procedural inquiry into the negotiation
process" by which the settlement was reached.1so
A particular derivative action, securities fraud case, antitrust
claim, or consumer class action is not like the others of its kind. In
these areas, inquiry into the "likely rewards of litigation" must necessarily center upon the progress of the particular class action in
question prior to consummation of the settlement. The extent of
discovery - into the merits of the plaintiff class's allegations and
the potential obstacles to recovery in the form of legal defenses, for
example - will be crucial where the class action in question is a
unique event. In the mass tort context, by contrast, the class action
is not a one-shot deal; rather, its objective is to resolve multitudes
of future claims that come in recurring patterns.
Courts should understand the first aspect of their review under
Rule 23(e) to center upon the expected terms of compensation in
the traditional tort litigation system - what the plaintiff class
would sacrifice under a settlement. In contrast to conventional
class actions, information on expected compensation terms need
not be generated exclusively or even primarily through discovery in
the class action itself but, rather, may stem from a preexisting body
of experience - however slim - with the treatment of similar
claims in the relevant mass tort stock market.
180. In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 796 (3d Cir.
1995); see also, e.g., Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Natl. Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 682 (7th
Cir. 1987); Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426, 433 (2d Cir. 1983); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698
F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Comparison of the settlement terms to tort recoveries does not
turn simply upon the dollar amounts in the compensation grid,
although that is certainly a significant issue. The inquiry also
should extend, for example, to the medical criteria applied to claims
under the settlement as well as to the noncash components of the
compensation scheme - such as the insurance provided to
unimpaired persons, limitations upon contingent fees for compensation claims, and so forth.
This is not to say that judicial review will ascertain with clarity
the outcomes that the tort system will produce. In the case of a
settlement for a relatively mature mass tort like asbestos, courts
may look - as did the district court in Georgine - to data on the
levels of compensation that individual plaintiffs historically have
obtained in tort litigation within the relevant disease categories.1 8 1
In the case of a relatively immature tort like breast implants, historical experience in the tort system is, by definition, limited, and the
range of plausible compensation levels may be quite wide due to
uncertainty over the merits of the plaintiffs' case.
The existence of a reference point in tort thus will not necessarily yield clear answers, just as a judge faced with a settlement of a
conventional class action "cannot really make a substantive judgment on the issues in the case without conducting some sort of trial
on the merits, exactly what the settlement is intended to avoid." 182
That substantial uncertainty may remain over how the settlement
compares with outcomes in the tort system, however, does not
mean that class counsel have carte blanche, just as an administrative agency does not slip its leash merely by "recit[ing] the terms
'substantial uncertainty' as a justification for its actions." 183 Rather,
courts should view the second component of judicial review under
Rule 23(e) - review into the negotiation process that produced the
settlement - as centering upon the manner by which counsel resolved such uncertainties.184 The oft-repeated truism is that settlements that result from "arms-length negotiations" should be
presumed to vindicate the interests of the plaintiff class.185 The
181. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 277 ('l[ 95) (E.D. Pa. 1994).
182. GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 796; see also Weinberger, 698 F2d at 74 (observing
that Rule 23(e) cannot mean "that, in order to avoid a trial, the judge must in effect conduct
one").
183. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983).
184. Cf. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 74 (noting that the second component of review has
arisen "[i]n order to supplement the ... necessarily limited examination of the settlement's
substantive terms" due to uncertainty over the outcome of the litigation).
185. See Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 74; see also, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141,
151 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
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more difficult question is how courts should go about determining
whether "arms-length negotiations" have occurred.
Hard look review in administrative law offers an elegant solution to this problem. Specifically, courts should use participatory
rights akin to the process of notice-and-comment rulemaking to call
forth information and argumentation contrary to the settling parties' agreement, to highlight uncertainties in the available information and to elicit a reasoned explanation for the settling parties'
choice of settlement terms. In this way, a conception of Rule 23(e)
in the mass tort context along the lines of administrative law can tie
together the two review components of which courts previously
have spoken. When understood from the standpoint of hard look
review, these two components are mutually reinforcing: the noticeand-comment process that serves as the check upon the settling parties' negotiation process also may act as the mechanism to bring
before the court information that bears upon the substantive terms
of compensation in the tort system. The inquiries into substance
and procedure thus are simply aspects of a broader enterprise to
ensure quality and fidelity in the decisionmaking that leads to a
mass tort settlement.
Moreover, such a process is particularly well suited to deal with
concerns that go beyond the level and form of compensation.
Other significant issues in mass tort settlements may center upon
matters of claim projection, risk allocation, and disparate treatment. Claim-projection issues go to whether enough money will be
on hand actually to provide class members with compensation at
the levels set forth in the grid. Questions of risk allocation raise
related concerns over who bears the risk of error in these projections and the steps, if any, taken in the settlement to account for
such risk. Issues of disparate treatment pertain to whether the settlement makes arbitrary distinctions between members of the plaintiff class or, conversely, whether certain members of the class may
have suffered from a failure to draw such distinctions.
These sorts of questions are similar, at their core, to the types of
regulatory decisions for which the courts have developed the hard
look. They inherently involve decisionmaking based upon projections - perhaps simply educated guesses - of what the world
would look like were a given action taken and about how such action should be organized to achieve a desired result. To borrow the
words of the State Farm Court, there may be "no direct evidence"
on the matters in question; instead, they may call for the exercise of
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"judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on the record
to a policy conclusion." 18 6 The goal is not for the reviewing court to
demand mathematical precision where none is possible; rather, the
point is for the court to insist that the settling parties grapple seriously with the inevitable tradeoffs and uncertainties and that they
offer a "rational connection" between the uncertainties they face
and choices they have made in the settlement.
Pieces of such a system already exist. The task for courts is to
pull them· together within the overarching framework of hard look
review:
(1) Courts should conceive of the requirement in Rule
23(c)(2) for the "best notice practicable" to the plaintiff class as the
rough equivalent of an NPRM under section 553 of the APA. 187
Specifically, courts should understand the content of such notice to
include not only a description of the settlement terms but also an
explanation - akin to the preamble to a proposed rule - of the
basic rationale and supporting information behind the selection of
those terms. The goal should be to enable those with initial suspicions about the settlement to have an informational base for more
detailed evaluation of the settling parties' reasoning.
Courts should not understand this preamble as a replacement
for the kind of descriptions, written in plain language understandable to nonlawyers, used in the asbestos and breast implant settlements. Quite to the contrary, in the interest of effective
communication with actual class members, descriptions in plain language should continue to be part of the "best practicable notice"
under Rule 23(c)(2).
The point is that courts should regard the target recipients of a
detailed preamble to be interest groups concerned with the plight of
class members. The notice campaigns for the recent settlements
point in this direction by seeking to bring the settlement to the attention of not only those individuals potentially within the class but
186. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52.
187. Compare FED. R. C!v. P. 23(c)(2) with Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b) (1994). The notion that private negotiations can give rise to regimes akin to those
established through rulemaking by administrative agencies is not confined to the context of
mass tort settlements. Several scholars have made similar observations with respect to consent decrees under Tttle VII. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, The Bar Against Challenges to
Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees: A Public Choice Perspective, 54 LA. L. REv.
1507, 1521, 1526-27 (1994); Maiman Schwartzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII
Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DuKE LJ. 887, 934.
See generally Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 Mica L.
REv. 321, 361-63 (1988).
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also labor and medical organizations.188 In building upon this experience, courts should seek to draw upon the organizational skills,
legal expertise, and fervor of interest groups as a way to overcome
what otherwise might be barriers to collective action on the part of
individual class members.189
In administrative law, environmental and consumer groups long
have played an indispensable role on behalf of regulatory beneficiaries by exposing faulty reasoning by administrative agencies. 190
Indeed, such groups - already up and running - have begun to
turn their attention to the distinctive problems that may arise when
plaintiffs' lawyers enter into class action settlements on behalf of
mass tort victims. For instance, Public Citizen Litigation Group a mainstay of environmental and consumer litigation in the administrative context - has been among the most vocal opponents of
the recent settlements.191
Mass torts often will implicate the concerns of existing interest
groups due to the manner in which class members are exposed. The
Georgine asbestos settlement has garnered the attention of labor
unions due to its focus upon occupational exposure of industrial
workers. 192 One may expect the same for other mass torts that
touch upon organized labor's longstanding concern with worker
health. Another familiar example - albeit, one that did not in188. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
189. See generally MANcuR OLSON, THE Lome OF Cou.EcnVE AcnoN 11, 15-16 (1965)
(providing an analysis of collective action problems).
190. See PETERS. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PouCY
(1994).
Beginning in the 1960s, courts permitted additional categories of persons affected by
administrative action to challenge its legality in court, including consumers, e.g., Office
of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(viewers' standing to challenge broadcast license renewal) and environmental groups,
e.g., [Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965)]...•
[T]he courts' rationale for these expanded rules of standing was that the relevant substantive statute reflected an implicit purpose to protect the interests of these litigants,
and that this statutorily-protected interest was a basis for standing on par with traditional liberty and property interests.
Id. at 810-11.
191. For an account of Public Citizen's role by two leaders of that organization, see Alan
B. Morrison & Brian Wolfman, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking
Monetary Relief (Apr. 22, 1995) (Paper presented before the Institute of Judicial Administration, New York University School of Law, Research Conference on Class Actions and
Related Issues in Complex Litigation).
192. In fact, the representative plaintiff who gives the Georgine litigation its name Robert Georgine - is the president of the Building Construction Trades Department of the
AFL-CIO. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 261 ('ll 4) (E.D. Pa. 1994).
For examples of unions in opposition to the Georgine settlement, see the listing of parties and
their counsel in Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2532,
at *3-*6 (E.D. Pa. 1995). (This listing is omitted from the opinion as reported in 160 F.R.D.
478 (E.D. Pa. 1995)).
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volve a settlement like that for asbestos or breast implants - is the
active role played by Vietnam veterans' organizations in the Agent
Orange litigation.193
Moreover, apart from existing interest groups, a mass tort itself
may give rise to the formation of organizations dedicated specifically to that subject. For example, the controversy surrounding
breast implants has led to the founding of various groups to safeguard the rights of recipients, in addition, of course, to the many
existing organizations concerned with the health of women.194 Litigation over the Dalkon Shield contraceptive device spawned the
same phenomenon of tort-specific group formation.19s
Finally, a public interest law group funded by the plaintiffs' bar
itself - Trial Lawyers for Public Justice - recently has announced
efforts to fight class action settlements that it considers unfair.196
(2) As a corollary to the foregoing point, courts should afford
participatory rights in fairness hearings under Rule 23(e) comparable to those available to interested persons in informal rulemaking.
In the fairness hearing on the breast implant settlement, for example, the district court afforded the opportunity to participate to all
persons who wished to comment upon the settlement, "regardless
of whether they had legal standing to be heard." 197 Similarly, the
district court in the Georgine asbestos settlement "granted all objecting class members full rights to participate in all aspects of [the]
proceedings, including 'the right to appear through counsel, participate in the fairness hearing and conduct discovery.' "198
(3) Courts should understand the fairness hearing under Rule
23(e) to be a forum for examination of the settling parties' justification for the settlement terms in light of comments from interested
193. See SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 16, at 25-26, 37-57.
194. See Don Lee et al., Twice Distressed, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at Dl (discussing the
rise of organizations for breast implant recipients); Dow Corning Created the Tort Monster,
WALL ST. J., June 8, 1995, at A13 (reprinting a letter on implant risks from Coalition of
Silicone Survivors).
195. For an account by the founder of one such organization, see KAREN M. HICKS, SURVIVING TIIE DALKON SHIELD IUD; WOMEN V. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 73-96,
119-26, 142-53 (1994). See also RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING TIIE LAW: THE STORY OF TIIE
DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 232-35 (1991) (describing the activities of the International
Dalkon Shield Victims' Education Association); Hensler & Peterson, supra note 27, at 1024
n.314 (identifying two additional groups specifically for Dalkon Shield plaintiffs); Vairo,
supra note 140, at 618-19 n.6 (describing the Dalkon Shield Information Network as "perhaps the largest support group for unrepresented Dalkon Shield claimants").
196. See Wade Lambert, Public-Interest Law Group Fights Some Class Settlements As
Unfair, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1995, at B4.
197. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *l.
198. Georgine v. Arnchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (quoting
earlier order affording such rights).
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persons. In the asbestos settlement, for example, the court heard
"the testimony of some twenty-nine witnesses (live or by deposition) during 18 hearing days over a period of five weeks," including
testimony from persons who had participated in the settlement negotiations, medical experts, financial experts, and several legal academics.199 Pursuit of an administrative law vision of Rule 23(e)
does not, however, necessarily require extended trial-type proceedings. In a world where courts reconceive of the settlement notice
under Rule 23(c)(2) along the lines of an NPRM, there may be less
need for lengthy courtroom proceedings to explore the factual justification for the settlement terms and any dissenting views. Instead,
such matters might be dealt with primarily upon written submissions in response to the "preamble" of the NPRM, albeit with supplementation as needed through trial-type procedures involving
witness testimony and examination. Here, courts might draw an
analogy to so-called hybrid rulemaking in administrative law that is, situations in which Congress has required agency rulemaking to follow a combination of procedures involving both written
submissions and selected trial-type elements.200
2. Particular Problems

With this basic framework in mind, I tum to two broad categories of problems raised by commentators in connection with the recent mass tort settlements to illustrate the virtues of judicial review
on the foregoing model. Frrst, I discuss the special challenges for
hard look review in the face of uncertainty concerning the number
of future claims, such as may arise with respect to settlements of
relatively immature mass torts. Second, I address the selection of
counsel for the plaintiff class. Specifically, I analyze the merits of
hard look review as compared to alternatives proposed by two sets
of commentators who envision greater judicial supervision of the
manner by which certain attorneys come to represent the plaintiff
class.
a. Claim Projection. The settlement of a relatively immature
mass tort can represent a genuine compromise over questions of
general causation, with both plaintiffs and defendants hedging
against the possibility that science will subsequently tum against
them.201 Developments in scientific knowledge may make the set199. 157 F.R.D. at 260; see 151 F.R.D. at 296-303 ('ll'l! 201-33), 306 ('ll'll 249-51).
200. For general background on hybrid rulemaking, see BREYER & STEWART, supra note
167, at 579-82 (citing statutory examples).
201. See supra section I.C.2.b.
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tlement seem like a good deal for one side or the other when
viewed in retrospect, but they do not hold the prospect of precipitating the alteration of compensation terms. For an immature mass
tort, however, uncertainty is not confined simply to the element of
causation but may extend as well to the number of claims that will
be submitted under the settlement. Absent a substantial body of
experience, it simply may be difficult to tell how many exposed persons exist and when the latency periods for the relevant diseases
will run. Uncertainty over claim projection - unlike questions of
general causation - has the potential to wreak havoc with the
compensation terms originally set in the settlement. An agreement
to pay compensation at levels specified in a grid is meaningful, after
all, only to the extent that enough money is available for the specified payments to be made to all who meet the medical criteria.
Here, I briefly discuss how the problem of claim projection relates
to the more general phenomenon of agency costs in class action
settlements. I then explain how the collapse of the breast implant
settlement due to claim projection problems illustrates the soundness of an approach to judicial review drawn from administrative
law.
The distribution of compensation within the plaintiff class whether any particular claimant actually will receive what is promised in the grid - will be of little concern to class counsel who wish
simply to obtain a fee award based upon the aggregate benefit to
the class as a whole, the hours worked by class counsel, or a combination of both.2 02 These variables remain constant regardless of
how many claimants ultimately share in the settlement pot. Even
when counsel also wish to undertake the representation of clients in
the aftermarket for claims under the settlement, reductions in the
compensation paid to each individual claimant might be overcome
through representation of more claims. In short, the focus upon
fees, in whatever form, is unlikely to make class counsel sensitive,
of their own accord, to uncertainty in claim projection.
Judicial review along the lines of the hard look is especially well
suited to deal with this problem. As an initial matter, the courts
should draw upon the notice-and-comment process and participatory rights in the fairness hearing to bring to light such information as may exist to facilitate claim projection. The objective of
this process is not necessarily to arrive at some definitive answer
where there is none to be found but, more importantly, to provide
202. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing methods for calculation of
class counsel fees).
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an indication of the degree of uncertainty on the subject. The more
significant component of hard look review should lie in a further
demand that the settling parties provide a reasoned explanation for
the way in which they have accounted for such uncertainty in their
agreement.
One approach, taken in Georgine, simply would provide that the
defendants remain obligated to pay all claims that qualify for compensation under the medical criteria described in the settlement.203
The question then will tum upon the prospective solvency of the
defendants over the period covered by the agreement - a matter
verified by the Georgine court with the aid of testimony from financial experts.204 Under this approach, plaintiffs will be no worse off
than they would be in the event of continued litigation in the tort
system; indeed, they might be better off to the extent that a resolution of tort liability in the form of a settlement may enhance the
ability of the defendants to draw upon the capital markets to facilitate productive enterprises in the future.2os
Defendants may be unwilling to assent to such an approach
when the risk of error in claim projection is relatively high, as is
likely to be the case for an immature mass tort. There nonetheless
are other devices available to deal with uncertainty. Specifically,
counsel might use the settlement agreement itself to generate better
information about the number of claims while, at the same time,
taking steps to afford flexibility to the plaintiff class in the event of
precipitous reductions in compensation.
The unraveling of the breast implant settlement, if anything, illustrates the soundness of such an approach. Unlike the asbestos
defendants who committed themselves to pay all claims that meet
certain medical criteria, breast implant manufacturers originally
agreed merely to provide a fixed sum of $4.2 billion to fund a settlement.206 The use of a fixed-sum device accentuates the problem of
claim projection, however, as the distribution of that sum in accordance with the compensation grid is dependent upon the accuracy of
such estimates. Indeed, the implant settlement provided for acrossthe-board reductions in compensation levels - a technique known
as "ratcheting" - in the event that the number of claims filed
203. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 278 (<JI 101).
204. See 157 F.R.D. at 286-91 ('Il'Il 142-70).
205. See 157 F.R.D. at 291(<JI169) (citing expert testimony that the Georgine settlement
will "significantly enhance the financial condition and prospects of" the settling defendants
by removing " 'uncertainty, which adversely affects these companies' ability to access the
capital markets, to raise debt in equity, or to attract people' ").
206. See Lindsey (Sept 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *l.
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within a specified time period would make it impossible to pay
compensation in amounts anywhere near the levels set forth in the
grid.2 01 Standing alone, then, a fixed-sum settlement in the face of
uncertainty over claim projection carries huge risks for the plaintiff
class.
Based upon comments raised in the course of the fairness hearing, the district court in the breast implant settlement focused its
attention upon this problem.20s Judge Pointer initially noted that
"no one has reliable data" with which to project the number of
claims; indeed, the judge candidly acknowledged that he could not
"even hazard a guess" in that regard. 209 Judge Pointer nonetheless
approved the settlement upon consideration of the manner in which
the settling parties had addressed such uncertainty. Specifically, he
noted that the settlement afforded class members a second opportunity to opt out in the event of a ratcheting down of compensation
levels.2 10 In other words, the settling parties in their private negotiations were able to go outside the single opt-out framework of Rule
23(b)(3) to develop a procedure through which they could begin "to
obtain the missing information [on the number of claims]" while
protecting the interests of the class.211
The importance of this innovation cannot be gainsaid. Shortly
after announcement of the breast implant settlement, it became
readily apparent that the claim projections underlying the agreement were highly inaccurate~ - so much so that the downward
ratcheting of compensation would have left some members of the
plaintiff class with as little as five percent of the amounts originally
promised.212 To forestall the possibility of massive defections from
the class through the second opt out, negotiations ensued to increase the fixed sum committed by defendants, but the unexpected
bankruptcy of Dow Corning derailed these efforts.213 Ultimately,
several of the remaining, solvent defendants joined together to of207. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *22; Lindsey Notice, supra note 18, at 7.
This process is not unique to mass tort settlements; inaccurate claim projections also have
necessitated the repeated reorganization of the trust established in bankruptcy for persons
injured by the asbestos products of Johns-Manville. See Findley v. Falise, 878 F. Supp. 473,
477-88 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995) (tracing the tortured history of the Manville trust).
208. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *20 (noting that "many [who challenged
the adequacy of the settlement] are concerned that the defendants' contributions ... will not
be sufficient to pay benefits at the levels shown in the [grid]").
209. Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *21-*22.
210. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *22-*23.
211. Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *23.
212. See Money Shortage Looms in Breast Implant Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1995, at 8.
213. See supra note 6.
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fer a modified settlement that, at least, would provide a framework
for compensation of women who received implants manufactured
by those particular firms. Not surprisingly, this more narrow settlement abandons the fixed-sum approach and, instead, would obligate the defendants to pay specific amounts of compensation to all
women who meet certain medical criteria - albeit, lower levels of
compensation and more stringent medical criteria than under the
original settlement.214 Such changes in the terms of compensation
are understandable, however, in light of newly published epidemiological studies that cast increasing doubt upon the causation element of the plaintiffs' case.21s
Commenting upon the breast implant example, John Coffee
draws the odd lesson that coilrts should insist upon the inclusion of
a second opportunity to opt out in mass tort settlements - essentially, as a matter of course.216 This prescription confuses results
with process. The objective is not for the court - without experience in the subject matter - to demand the inclusion of particular
settlement terms. Instead, the breast implant example illustrates
the way in which a court may structure a decisionmaking process
such that settling counsel must grapple seriously with issues of claim
projection.
The beauty of the hard look is that it can guard against the
shortchanging of the plaintiff class through erroneous claim projections while, at the same time, affording room for counsel to exercise
creativity and innovation in the development of means to address
the problem. A second opt out may be mutually acceptable in
some situations; the :fixed-criteria approach in Georgine may work
elsewhere; as-yet-unseen techniques may be appropriate in other
areas. The point is not so much how the problem is addressed but
that it either gets addressed in a reasoned manner tailored to the
subject area involved or prevents a mass tort settlement from going
forward at all.
In this manner, the hard look has the incidental benefit of
guarding against the prospect of settlements that come too early in
214. See Meier, Revised Settlement, supra note 6, at A9 ("Under the new proposal,
women can qualify for awards of $75,000 to $500,000 if they meet more stringent medical
criteria. To do so, they would have to submit more medical documentation than required by
the first settlement and could have to undergo new tests."). The manufacturers involved in
this revised settlement are Bristol-Myers Squibb, Baxter Healthcare, and 3M. See id. In late
December 1995, Judge Pointer approved this revised agreement. See Judge Approves Implant Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1995, at C2.
215. See supra note 98.
216. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1448-49, 1465.
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the development cycle of mass torts. When issues of claim projection are so amorphous as to confound the negotiating skills of counsel to fashion a solution that protects the plaintiff class while
affording a modicum of repose to defendants, it is probably just as
well to stick with the traditional tort system until more is known.
The point is that these tradeoffs can be made by counsel, mindful
that they will have to defend the reasoning behind any solution they
might fashion in light of critical commentary.
b. Class Counsel. Apart from problems of claim projection,
commentators also have focused upon the way in which counsel
come to represent the plaintiff class. They argue that courts might
seek to address agency cost problems not merely through ex post
review of the settlement terms but also by becoming involved ex
ante in the selection of class counsel. Indeed, one approach implies
that courts may avoid entirely the need for review of settlements by
using an auction-based system to align the incentives of class counsel and the plaintiff class before negotiations take place with defendants.217 A second strand of commentary calls for courts to
exercise control over the selection of counsel for the plaintiff class
in order to prevent defendants from choosing as their negotiating
partners some subsegment of the plaintiffs' bar that is willing indeed, whom defendants might induce - to sell out future
claimants.218
i. Auctions. The most imaginative of these approaches, developed by Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, envisions the auctioning of the right to represent the plaintiff class. Macey and
Miller first developed their auction-based approach in the context
of corporate and securities class actions and recently have explored
the possibility of its extension to the mass tort area as well.219 They
posit that a court might accept bids from various law firms - potentially, even from the defendants themselves - for the right to
represent the plaintiff class. The amount of the winning bid would
go to the class and the winning bidder would receive, in exchange,
the class members' rights of action against the defendants.220
Such an approach would have the considerable benefit of aligning completely the interests of the plaintiff class in maximizing their
217. See infra section III.B.2.b.i.
218. See infra section III.B.2.b.ii.
219. See Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 10; see also Macey &
Miller, Market Approach, supra note 10.
220. See Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 10, at 106-08; Macey &
Miller, Market Approach, supra note 10, at 912-17.
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recovery with the financial interests of class counsel - namely, the
winning bidder who would now own the plaintiffs' rights of action.
Indeed, such alignment prior to the commencement of settlement
negotiations between the winning bidder and defense counsel - if
viable - would tend to alleviate the need for judicial scrutiny of
the resulting settlement terms.
As a practical matter, however, an auction-based approach
would not be workable in the mass tort context. First, the sheer
amount of money involved likely would exceed the ability of even a
consortium of plaintiffs' law firms to form a plausible bid - at
least, absent revolutionary changes in legal ethics. The implant settlement, for instance, posits the transfer of over $4.2 billion in compensation to the plaintiff class,221 and even that amount ultimately
proved too little. The Georgine court estimated that compensation
under the asbestos settlement will run to over $1.2 billion.222 These
amounts are several orders of magnitude greater than the sums that
the plaintiffs' bar thus far has proven able to raise for purposes of
defraying the fixed costs of mass tort litigation.223
In the face of such amounts, prospective bidders might seek to
raise money through the sale of equity interests - in essence,
shares of stock - in the lawsuit that the winning bidder would be
entitled to bring against the defendant companies upon acquisition
of the plaintiffs' rights of action. Such a device, however, would
entail sweeping changes in ethical principles that prevent the marketing of financial interests in a lawsuit224 - far more sweeping
than would be occasioned by Macey and Miller's original suggestion that class counsel acquire such an interest because the equities
here would have to be marketed to nonlawyer investors as well.
Likewise, a prospective bidder from within the plaintiffs' bar
might seek to borrow the necessary funds from lending institutions.
In exchange, the lender would have to adjust the interest rate to
account for the risk that the bidder ultimately might prove unsuccessful in litigation against the relevant mass tort defendants.225
221. See Lindsey (Sept. 1, 1994), supra note 2, at *l.
222. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
223. Cf. supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing agreements to fund the
development of generic assets).
224. See generally Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J.
LEGAL Sruo. 329, 330-34 {1987) (discussing longstanding ethical barriers to the marketing of
claims).
225. In the commercial context, of course, an alternative to adjustment of the interest
rate would be the retention by the lender of a security interest in some form of asset in the
hands of the debtor, such as accounts receivable, industrial equipment, or valuable patents.
By contrast, the assets of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar are unlikely to be amenable to such
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The interest rate might be modest for a loan in connection with a
class action over a mature mass tort, where the prospects for success in litigation against the defendants may well be high. For an
immature mass tort, the prospects for successful litigation would remain clouded with uncertainty, such that the lender would have to
insist upon an unusually high rate of interest - in essence, a junk
bond.226 The effect, once again, would be for nonlawyers to retain a
financial interest in the law practice of the plaintiffs' bar - here, a
financial interest in such alternative areas of practice as the debtor
firm might pursue in order to pay off the loan, should litigation on
behalf of the mass tort plaintiff class prove unsuccessful.
Macey and Miller make a valuable contribution by questioning
the ethical constraints on the financing of litigation. But, in an age
of increasing distrust of the legal profession, it seems highly unlikely that any change in legal ethics that realistically might occur in
the near future would result in less constraint rather than more.
Absent the ability of the plaintiffs' bar to tap the resources of
nonlawyers, the winning bidder likely would be the defendant either directly or possibly through the financing of a bid by a particular plaintiffs' law firm of its choice.
Even if a plaintiffs' firm could manage to assemble the requisite
cash, formidable disincentives would remain to participation in the
bidding process. A plausible bid still would have to set forth some
mechanism to distribute the funds to the plaintiff class. Given the
temporal dispersion of mass tort claims, this surely is not a simple
task, unlike the typical derivative action where the bid simply
would be deposited into the corporate treasury or securities litigation where the bid would be distributed in short order amongst the
affected shareholders, as identified through brokerage records.
Formulation of a compensation regime takes information about the
various medical issues involved, the expected number of claims, and
so forth - the kind of expertise likely to be built up only at a substantial fixed cost. The consequence could be that no one will bid,
for fear that any effort to develop the requisite compensation regime will be supplanted by other bidders who simply could pledge
more money to increase funding across the board for any compen-

treatment. Apart from office equipment and the like, the assets of the plaintiffs' bar are
largely reputational; they consist primarily of the ability to obtain new clients on the strength
of victories for prior clients.
226. The use of junk bonds as a financing device for bids would raise the ironic prospect
of mass tort litigation resulting in bankruptcy to plaintiffs' law firms.

960

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 94:899

sation regime that might be put forward. 227 Alternatively, the winning bidder simply might be one who already has achieved a
dominant position in the subject area through previous efforts to
develop the requisite information for purposes of tort litigation precisely the sorts of plaintiffs' law :firms with whom defendants
have bargained in the recent settlements.
The upshot is that, in the mass tort context, an auction-based
approach is unlikely to do more than re-create what private negotiations already have achieved, if that.
ii. Reverse Auctions. A second line of commentary also focuses upon the problem of class counsel selection and draws, once
again, upon the image of an auction, of sorts. In separate papers,
John Coffee and Susan Koniak decry what they see as the ability of
defendants to select as their negotiating partners the members of
the plaintiffs' bar who are willing to enter into the cheapest mass
tort settlement.228 As Professor Coffee vividly summarizes the
point: "At its worst, this process can develop into a reverse auction,
with the low bidder among the plaintiffs ' attorneys winning the
right to settle with the defendant. "229 Both Coffee and Koniak take
as their example the Georgine asbestos settlement. In their view,
the settling defendants not only selected class counsel in order to
cut the cheapest possible deal, defendants also provided special
benefits to class counsel for doing so.
As noted earlier, the plaintiff class in Georgine consisted exclusively of future claimants - namely, persons exposed to asbestos
products from the defendant companies who had yet to sue in tort
at the time of the settlement agreement.230 Persons who had sued
by that date but whose cases had yet to be resolved - so-called
inventory cases - did not come within the class definition and, accordingly, were not bound to the compensation terms in the settlement. Coffee and Koniak correctly observe that the defendants
effected settlements of the inventory cases represented by class
counsel in a manner separate from the class action settlement and
under different terms of compensation.
227. Cf. WEINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 263 n.159 (quoting a letter from John Coffee raising
similar difficulties with an auction-based approach); Macey & Miller, Market Approach,
supra note 10, at 916 (acknowledging that "it would be necessary for a court to establish
some type of claims facility with appropriate staffing and technical support").
228. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10; Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow
Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995).
229. Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1354.
230. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 257-58 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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Specifically, Coffee and Koniak. note that, with respect to the
inventory cases represented by class counsel, defendants afforded
cash payments to persons who had yet to suffer impairment - precisely what the class action settlement does not provide.231 Overall,
the inventory cases represented by one of the firms that served as
class counsel, for example, received a total of over $138 million in
compensation - fifty-four percent more in dollar terms than the
roughly $89 million that the same cases would have received, by
Professor Coffee's estimate, had they come within the class action
settlement.232 Based upon this observation, Professor Coffee goes
on to recommend, in effect, a per se rule against mass tort settlements that define the plaintiff class to include only future claimants,
not inventory cases pending in the tort system.233 In addition, he
calls upon courts to exercise control over the selection of class
counsel by establishing a steering committee - representative of
the various plaintiffs' firms involved in the subject area - to conduct settlement negotiations with defendants.234
The Coffee-Koniak critique is a challenging one. Indeed, the
possibility that defendants might provide class counsel with lucrative compensation terms for their inventory cases would mesh
neatly with a cut-and-run strategy on the part of those :firms.235 The
potential for such abuse and its effectuation are two different
231. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1394; Koniak, supra note 228, at 1064-65.
232. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1397; see also Koniak, supra note 228, at
1067 & n.104.. In addition to comparing the Georgine settlement terms with those afforded to
the inventory cases of class counsel, Professor Coffee recently has made a second observation: that the compensation payments set forth in the Georgine settlement grid are markedly
less than those in a seemingly similar grid developed in a separate proceeding for purposes of
the Johns-Manville bankruptcy trust. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1395-96.
Thus, for instance, Professor Coffee asserts that, upon "[c]omparing the two [grids], one sees
that, in the ordinary case, a disabled victim of asbestosis will receive $50,000 under the JohnsManville [bankruptcy] settlement but only between $5800 and $7500 under Georgine." Id. at
1396.
That is simply untrue. The claims of all persons injured by the asbestos products of JohnsManville are subject to pro rata reduction to account for the limited funds available in the
bankruptcy trust. See Fmdley v. Falise, 878 F. Supp. 473, 495 (E. & S.D.N.Y.1995) (prefacing
the compensation grid with the caveat that claims are "subject to pro rata reduction"). As a
result, the tort victims of Johns-Manville will receive only about 13.6% of the amounts indicated on the grid. See 878 F. Supp. at 484. Moreover, even if one ignores these pro rata
reductions, the comparison to Johns-Manville in no way undercuts the point that the compensation levels in the Georgine grid accurately reflect the experience in the tort system of
the particular asbestos defendants who are parties to that settlement - defendants whom
Professor Coffee acknowledges to be differently situated than Johns-Manville. See Coffee,
Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1396.
233. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1455.
234. See id. at 1454.
235. See supra section 11.B (discussing cut-and-run strategy).
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things, however,236 and the task of discerning between the two is
one readily amenable to judicial review along the lines of the hard
look. In particular, Coffee and Koniak's image of a reverse auction
underestimates the constraints that flow from an open, participatory process for review of mass tort settlements.
At its core, the image of a reverse auction means that there
must be losers - namely, counsel who would have some plausible
claim to represent the plaintiff class based upon experience in the
litigation at hand but whom defendants do not select as their negotiating partners. The attraction of an approach to judicial review
rooted in notice-and-comment rulemaking lies in its ability to draw
upon the rivalries within the mass tort plaintiffs' bar to safeguard
the interests of class members. Such an approach enables the "losing" plaintiffs' firms to bring to light exactly the sorts of sweetheart
deals for class counsel that a reverse auction might engender. In
fact, the losing firms will have a powerful incentive to highlight unfair compensation terms given that they, unlike class counsel, will
obtain no fee award whatsoever as representatives of the plaintiff
class and, hence, will not have the opportunity to cut and run; instead, they - like future claimants themselves - face the prospect
of life in the aftermarket for compensation claims under the
settlement.
The mere possibility of opposition by rival members of the
plaintiffs' bar, ironically enough, may well deter defendants from
pursuing a reverse auction strategy in the first place, as such opposition will increase the barriers to judicial approval of any resulting
agreement. An attempt to engage in a reverse auction, in other
words, will sow the seeds of its own destruction where counsel excluded from the negotiating table remain free to object.
The very example that Coffee and Koniak seize upon illustrates
the operation of this mechanism. Here, details are significant, as
they serve to illuminate the erroneous premises from which this line
of criticism has proceeded. In the Georgine fairness hearing,
Frederick Baron of the Dallas law firm of Baron & Budd led the
charge against the settlement.237 The objectors even went so far as
236. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 306 ('lf 252) (E.D. Pa. 1994)
("The opportunity to collude is not enough for a finding of collusion ••. especially given this
Court's thorough analysis of the fairness of the terms of the class action settlement pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.").
237. Like class counsel, Baron too came to the proceedings as a "giant in the cause of
asbestos plaintiffs," with two decades of experience in the litigation. Dale Russakoff, Asbestos Pact: Legal Model or Monster?, WASH. POST, May 11, 1994, at A12. For an informal
history of Baron's rise as an asbestos litigator, see Taylor, supra note 44, at 1, 9-11. In fact,
"[i]n the 1970s, Baron and [Ronald] Motley, then in their twenties, separately unearthed
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"to solicit opt outs all over the United States" through what the
district court described as a "massive campaign" of "misleading"
communications concerning the terms of the Georgine settlement.238 Indeed, the court ultimately considered it necessary to invalidate the opt outs believed to have resulted from this campaign
and to take the unprecedented further step of affording the affected
class members a new opportunity to make their opt-out decisions,
this time based upon a court-approved description of the settlement
terms.239
Though certainly a vivid confirmation of the objectors' intensity,
such misconduct is not essential to the operation of an administrative model for judicial review. Wholly apart from the campaign to
induce opt outs,240 Baron set forth in the Georgine fairness hearing
precisely the reverse auction allegations described here, drawing
upon testimony from no less than Professor Coffee himself, who
appeared as an expert witness on a pro bono basis.241
The fundamental problem with Coffee and Koniak's comparison
of the dollar amounts of compensation lies in its failure to account
for the noncash elements characteristic of mass tort settlements like
that in Georgine: principally, the twenty-five percent cap on contingency fees, the time value of money from speedier payment of compensation, and the insurance afforded to as-yet-unimpaired persons.
The question is not simply whether the inventory cases got more
money; they should have. Instead, the question is whether the difference in the cash compensation received by the inventory cases
over and above what they would have received under the Georgine
settlement bears a reasoned connection to the other benefits afforded in lieu of cash.
To answer this question, the district court took two approaches
- both of which closely resemble State Farm's demand for the articulation of a "rational connection between the facts found and the
proof that key asbestos makers systematically hid the fact that their product was harmful."
Russakoff, supra, at A12.
238. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
239. See 160 F.R.D. at 518.
240. There is no indication of involvement by any member of the legal academy in the
objecting parties' campaign to induce opt outs based upon misleading descriptions of the
settlement.
241. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 310-11 ('ll'!l 278·82) (E.D. Pa.
1994) (rejecting Coffee's testimony). Professor Koniak also testified, challenging class counsel's conduct on ethical grounds, but the court rejected that line of attack as well. See 157
F.R.D. at 302-03 (<Jl'l[ 229-33). On the nature of the testimony from both witnesses, see
Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1343 n. * (pro bono); Koniak, supra note 228, at 1045 n.t
(paid).
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choice made."242 First, the court called upon counsel who fashioned the class action settlement to come forward with data on the
amounts historically paid by the defendants for cases represented
by class counsel in the tort system.243 The court then appointed its
own special master to compare these data to the amounts of compensation afforded to the inventory cases - an analysis that revealed the two to be comparable.244 In short, the court used the
historical data on defendants' settlements with class counsel in the
tort system to ascertain that the inventory cases resolved in tandem
with the class action had not received an unduly lucrative deal specifically, that they had not received a cash premium over and
above that which the tort system historically provided in lieu of the
noncash benefits afforded under the class action settlement.
Second, the court drew upon findings earlier in its opinion again, based upon information developed during the fairness hearing - to conclude that the nature of the noncash benefits under the
class action settlement reasonably could account for the higher
level of cash compensation paid to the inventory cases.245 Specifically, the court observed that compensation under the class action
settlement would involve "considerably lower transaction costs, including attorneys' fees."246 The reduction in attorneys' fees alone
- from thirty-three to forty percent in asbestos litigation to a maximum of twenty-five percent under the settlement247 - would necessitate that cash compensation for the inventory cases be set some
twelve to twenty-five percent higher for all disease categories simply to equalize the money the plaintiffs actually will receive. 248 One
reasonably may account for the rema4tlng difference between the
242. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371U.S.156, 168 (1962)).
243. See Georgine, 151 F.R.D. at 307 ('ll 254).
244. See 157 F.R.D. at 307-08 ('ll'll 254, 259-63). The court's approach did not follow an
administrative model in all its features, however, as the court did not make available these
historical data to the objecting parties. See 157 F.R.D. at 307 ('ll 254) (noting that settling
parties provided such data to the special master on a "confidential" basis). The court appears
to have regarded its appointment of a special master as a substitute for adversarial review of
the data.
245. See 157 F.R.D. at 310-11 ('ll 281).
246. 157 F.R.D. at 310-11 ('ll 281).
247. See 157 F.R.D. at 285 ('ll'll 136-37).
248. This estimate results from the following equation:
(C,) x (1 - F,) = (Cs) x (1 - Fs)
where: c, = compensation for inventory case
Cs = compensation for same case under class action settlement
F, =contingency fee applicable to inventory case (33-40%)
Fs = contingency fee applicable to same case under class action settlement
(25%).
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cash compensation paid to the inventory cases and that afforded to
the plaintiff class by reference to the insurance component of the
class action settlement - a feature that the district court found to
be absent from the terms afforded to the inventory cases.249
Beyond the details of Georgine, the broader lesson is that hard
look review - judicial insistence that proponents provide a reasoned explanation for the distinctions drawn in a mass tort settlement - is capable of detecting the sorts of agency costs that may
arise from the entrepreneurial interests of counsel. In particular,
review on an administrative model provides appropriate incentives
for settling counsel faced with a choice between pursuit of an early
settlement, when little historical data may be available but where
liberalization of causation requirements may be highly significant,
and resolution at a more advanced stage, when the opposite may be
true. Had the settling parties in Georgine been unable to draw
upon historical experience in the tort system to support the reasonability of their inventory settlements, for example, a reviewing
court might well have been unable to discern a basis for the differences in treatment afforded to those cases. Conversely, counsel
may enjoy greater flexibility in the manner in which they structure a
settlement when a body of historical data exists against which to
check their handiwork. The point of the hard look is to leave the
inevitable tradeoffs between structure and timing - in the first instance - to those most intimately familiar with the nature of the
litigation at hand.
One potential response to this argument might be that Professor
Coffee's call for judicial selection of a committee to conduct negotiations on behalf of the plaintiff class nonetheless may serve as a
useful measure to prevent abuse. Why rely on post hoc review, in
other words, if one might prevent infidelities from occurring by
fashioning a suitable "bargaining unit" at the outset? The problem
249. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 311 ('l! 281) (noting that the insurance component - the
prospect that "claimants with non-malignant conditions will be able to receive additional
compensation if and when they contract cancer" - distinguishes the class action settlement
from the terms offered to the inventory cases). Even if one had to account for the entire
difference in cash compensation by reference to this insurance component, the allocation of
$48 million amongst the 9777 nonmalignant cases in Ness, Motley's inventory - those in
need of insurance to guard against the risk of cancer - would leave each such case with
$4909 in cash. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1397 (difference in cash compensation is approximately $48 million); Koniak, supra note 228, at 1067 n.104 (chart depicting
Ness, Motley inventory cases). That figure is not markedly out of line with the $3995 that the
average American business pays annually to provide health insurance to an individual employee, see U.S. CHAMBER REsEARCH Crn., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 1994 EomoN: SURVEY
DATA FROM BENEFIT YEAR 1993, at 17 (1994) - an employee, of course, with comparatively minimal exposure to asbestos and, hence, a lower risk of cancer than the typical inventory case.
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with such a view is that it overlooks the reasons why a settlement
class limited to future claimants may be affirmatively desirable.
Both Coffee and Koniak neglect to note that, upon MDL consolidation of federal asbestos litigation, considerable negotiation, in
fact, did take place between a judicially approved steering committee representative of the asbestos plaintiffs' bar and their counterparts in the defense bar.250 Indeed, Frederick Baron - the
eventual leader of the objectors in Georgine - was a member of
the committee.2 s1 The problem, as the Georgine court aptly put it,
was that neither side could "get beyond the lowest common denominator" within its own ranks.252 In the parlance of economics, this is
a classic illustration of a holdout problem - a situation in which
some subset of those involved in a collective negotiation are in a
position to scuttle any genuine compromise that does not give them
everything they want.253 Understood in this light, an inflexible requirement that mass tort settlement negotiations be conducted, if at
all, by a broadly representative steering committee of plaintiffs'
lawyers would form a blueprint for holdouts.
What actually happened in Georgine points the way out of this
morass. Rather than consign everyone to more asbestos litigation
in the tort system, the members of each camp who were willing to
negotiate toward the creation of an alternative administrative regime - the two plaintiffs' firms who came to serve as class counsel
and twenty of the asbestos defendants - broke off from the holdouts.254 Such behavior certainly creates the risk of the reverse auction phenomenon that Coffee and Koniak quite properly fear, but it
also gives rise to the prospect of a genuine compromise that may
leave the plaintiff class better off than under the tort system - albeit, not to the full extent that every member of the plaintiffs' bar
might like. Compromise is just that; it does not mean getting everything that you want.
One may best understand the decision to define the Georgine
class to exclude pending asbestos cases as a way for the settling par250. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 265-67 (n 30-36); supra section I.C.1.
251. See Andrew Blum, Asbestos Counsel, NATL. L.J., Oct. 21, 1991, at 2.
252. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 266 (1 35).
253. For allusions to the possibility of holdouts in class action settlement negotiations, see
Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 684 (7th
Cir. 1987) ("[T]hree-cornered negotiations are clumsy at best, especially when one of the
corners ... adopts an obdurate negotiating position."); and Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143
F.R.D. 141, 156 (S.D. Ohio 1992) ("[I]f this Court had required Class Counsel and the Defendants to include in their negotiations all attorneys representing absent class members, the
negotiations probably would have deteriorated into a cacophonous clamor of voices.").
254. See Georgine, 151 F.R.D. at 266 (1 35).
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ties to solve the holdout problem. Such pending cases must have
had legal representation in order to have been filed. Accordingly,
had the class included all pending cases, class counsel would have
had to include in the negotiations their holdout colleagues within
the plaintiffs' bar, lest class counsel be guilty of "poaching" upon
the lawyer-client relationships those rival firms had previously established. It is one thing to effect a settlement of claims for future
claimants; it is quite another - indeed, it probably would be tortious255 - for class counsel to settle the claims of persons already
represented by another law firm.
The alternative that the settling parties in Georgine pursued was
to exclude all inventory claims from the class action but to afford
them a cash premium in lieu of the noncash benefits conferred by
the settlement. Most notably, not only did the defendants afford
such treatment to the inventory cases represented by class counsel,
they also resolved, on similar terms, an equal number of inventory
cases represented by firms unaffiliated with class counsel.256 This
singular fact - not mentioned by either Coffee or Koniak - further undercuts the suggestion of a sweetheart deal to induce the
support of class counsel for the Georgine settlement; quite to the
contrary, it is consistent with an understanding of the proceedings
as a solution to a holdout problem.
All of this is to say that hard look review - albeit ex post in
character - offers a superior method to control the phenomenon
of a reverse auction while, at the same time, preserving flexibility
for those who are willing to fashion a genuine compromise free
from the problem of holdouts. Those who might otherwise have
scuttled a collective negotiation may serve a valuable role as critics
in a notice-and-comment process, without being empowered to
spoil all chances for a settlement agreement that may benefit the
plaintiff class.
C.

The Limits of an Administrative Perspective

Although judicial review on an administrative model represents
a plausible response to the recent phenomenon of mass tort settlements, the model is not without limitations. Here, I discuss the two
255. Many courts have recognized a cause of action for tortious interference by a third
party with an ongoing lawyer-client relationship. See, e.g., Cross v. American Country Ins.
Co., 875 F.2d 625 {7th Cir. 1989) {Illinois law); Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt
v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Terrlink & Bell, 138 Cal. Rptr. 670 (Ct App.1977); Sharrow
v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 511 A2d 492 (Md. 1986).
256. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 295-96 ('ll'll 193, 196).
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most prominent of these limits, which go to the interests of the reviewing court itself and to questions of legitimacy.
1. Institutional Bias

One significant difference between judicial review of rulemaking by an administrative agency and review of a mass tort settlement lies in the institutional interests of the reviewing court. In
administrative law, the court can act as a neutral umpire, resolving
disputes between the rulemaking agency and its critics. In the mass
tort context, however, the prospect of a settlement that would remove future claims from the judicial system - and perhaps
thousands of pending cases as well - has obvious institutional implications for the court itself. In the extreme, a court exercising
review under Rule 23(e) may have an incentive to rubber stamp a
mass tort settlement simply to rid itself of such meddlesome
claims.257
This concern has some merit, although its impact easily may be
exaggerated. First, if ever there were a case in which one might
expect an institutional bias in favor of approval to be overwhelming, it would be a mass tort settlement in the asbestos area. The
burdens of this particular litigation upon the dockets at all levels of
the judicial system were well known prior to the negotiations that
produced the Georgine settlement. A special committee of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, convened at the request
of Chief Justice Rehnquist, painted an alarming picture in this regard.258 Indeed, a cynic might see the Rehnquist Committee's report and the MDL Panel's subsequent references to the prospects
for settlement upon consolidation of the federal asbestos litigation259 as lending a degree of respectability to judicial bias in favor
of settlement approval. Nonetheless, when properly understood,
the fairness determination of the district court in Georgine was
hardly a rubber stamp.260
Second, to the extent that institutional bias in favor of approval
can surmount judicial norms of self restraint, such bias is likely to
arise at the appellate level to a far lesser degree than in the lower
courts. The federal courts of appeals simply do not bear the brunt
257. See Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs''Attomey's Role, supra note 10, at 45-46.
258. See REPORT OF THE JumCIAL CONFERENCE Ao Hoc CoMMITrEE ON ASBESTOS
LmGATION 7-10 (1991) [hereinafter REHNQUIST CoMMITI'EE REPORT].
259. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
260. But cf. infra section III.C.2.a (discussing criticism of the Georgine court's analysis of
class certification under Rule 23).

February 1996]

Tort to Administration

969

of mass tort litigation in the same way as the district courts,261 and
that is all to the good when it comes to appellate review of decisions
to approve mass tort settlements. The hardness of hard look review, in other words, is a matter susceptible to correction by the
courts of appeals, and the mere threat of reversal - with the possibility that the whole matter will be thrown back into the lap of the
district judge - can act as a deterrent to dereliction at the district
court level.
2.

Legitimacy

Were the risk of institutional bias by the reviewing court the
only potential shortcoming of an administrative model, further developments probably would be unnecessary. The more troubling
limitation of an administrative perspective, however, lies not in the
inclinations of courts but in the central role that private attorneys
play as settlement architects. Private attorneys may have expertise
in a specific area of mass tort litigation akin to that of a public administrative agency in a given field of regulation, but private attorneys simply do not have the same political legitimacy. The
authority of an administrative agency to engage in rulemaking
stems from a delegation of power from Congress which, in turn,
traces its regulatory authority to Article I of the Constitution, In
contrast, no one delegated to Ronald Motley and his cohorts the
power to resolve mass tort litigation on a prospective basis.262
The absence of such delegated power is precisely what has
forced the mass tort bar to resort to the class action mechanism of
Rule 23 in order to give binding effect to the settlements they have
fashioned. The application of Rule 23, however, has not proven
smooth. A crisis of legitimacy has manifested itself in two interrelated ways: first, in concern over the use of the class action device
to effect a mass tort settlement when class certification might not
have been warranted for purposes of actual litigation; and second,
in lingering uncertainty over the basis for personal jurisdiction over
261. The Cimino litigation offers a vivid illustration of the difference in perspective between circuit courts and district courts in this regard. District Judge Parker decried what he
perceived as the Fifth Circuit's resistance to his efforts to streamline the disposition of the
asbestos cases in his court through the use of aggregative techniques; indeed, he went so far
as to remark blithely that he "should have caused thirty to forty identical appeals to have
been processed in order to enhance the awareness level of the Court of Appeals." Cimino v.
Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1990), appeal argued, No. 93-4452 (5th Cir.
Feb. 8, 1995).
262. See supra note 166 (discussing the absence of an analogue to the Chevron inquiry in
administrative law, which asks whether the agency has acted within the bounds of its delegated authority).

970

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 94:899

class members. These issues remain unsettled, with only a handful
of courts speaking directly to either question thus far. My purpose
here is not so much to resolve these issues but to explain how their
very existence sheds light upon the limitations of an administrative
model for mass tort settlements. In so doing, I seek to frame the
terms for debate over the solution that I offer in Part IV as a way to
alleviate such concerns.
a. Class Certification. By its terms, Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes
the certification of an opt-out class action upon a finding that
"questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."263 The problem
in the mass tort context is that such questions as may be common to
the class are also likely to be bound up \vith differences in the common law of tort from state to state - differences that tend to undercut the superiority of a class action as a device for adjudication.
Indeed, the choice of substantive law to apply over large numbers
of geographically dispersed claims is a question that has long
plagued judicial efforts to resolve mass torts through active class
action litigation. Some judges have sought to solve the problem by
purporting to glean a consensus from the common law of the various states, but such efforts quite properly have met with skepticism.264 As Judge Posner has observed, any attempt by a federal
court to apply "a legal standard that does not actually exist anywhere in the world" smacks of exactly the kind of general common
law that the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins held to be
beyond the power of the federal courts in diversity cases.265

263. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). This requirement of subsection (b)(3) accords with the
general requirement in subsection (a)(2) that a federal court may certify a class action in any
form "only if ... there are questions of law or fact common to the class." FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a)(2).
264. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300-02 (7th Cir. 1995)
(issuing mandamus to decertify class action where district judge had envisioned trial of nationwide products liability class action under a single negligence instruction); SCHUCK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 16, at 128-31 (criticizing the concept of consensus law,
one of several bases asserted by Judge Weinstein for class certification in Agent Orange
litigation).
265. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80
(1938)). But see Macey & Miller, Market Approach, supra note 10, at 911 ("Federal courts
should jettison the unworkable Erie rule in the mass tort context and replace it with a rational approach that recognizes the necessity of federal common law in this area." (footnote
omitted)).
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An alternative approach that avoids the need to generate some
"brooding omnipresence" of federal common law266 - albeit one
that reduces the efficiency of the class action - is that taken in
litigation over asbestos in the nation's school buildings. There, the
Third Circuit upheld certification of a class action for litigation purposes upon ascertaining that the relevant tort claims were reducible
to four basic patterns,267 such as would make them amenable to
trial through a series of special verdicts.
At :first glance, the use of Rule 23 purely for purposes of giving
effect to a settlement, rather than as a device to organize active
class action litigation, would seem to offer a way out of these difficulties. Under this view - endorsed by the leading treatise on
class actions and explicitly adopted by the district court in Georgine
- the element of commonality may be satisfied more readily in the
settlement context; as the Georgine court put it, the question of
whether the settlement is fair may, in itself, serve as the
"predomina[nt]" issue common to the members of the plaintiff class
as a whole.268 Judge Pointer appears to have taken a similar view in
the breast implant settlement. There, he certified the plaintiff class
only provisionally, pending approval of the class action settlement.269 Again, the suggestion seems to be· that the settlement itself provides the requisite common issue - indeed, that the class
action format might not work for actual litigation of breast implant
suits.
Such a view, however, begs the question whether the settlement
should be before a federal court at all.210 The element of commonality is not simply a requirement for the convenience of the court one that goes merely to the workability of a class action trial and
that may be more easily satisfied when a trial is not in the offing. It
also implicates the justification for displacement of litigation in
state fora by a federal class action - one capable of roping in nondiverse claims as long as complete diversity exists merely between
266. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("The common Jaw is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of
some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified.").
267. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986).
268. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 316 (IJI 7) (E.D. Pa. 1994); see
also In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 738-40 (4th Cir. 1989); 2 NEWBERG & CoNTE, supra
note 124, § 11.28, at 11-57 to 11-58.
269. See Lindsey (Apr. 1, 1994), supra note 119, at *3.
270. Cf. In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 797 (3d Cir.
1995) ("To state that class members were united in the interest of maximizing over-all recovery begs the question.").

972

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 94:899

the representative plaintiffs and the defendants.211 As Judge
Edward Becker recently phrased the point outside of the mass tort
context, the risk is that the class action device will "convert[] a federal court into a mediation forum for cases that belong elsewhere,
usually in state court."272 Under this second view, the appropriate
stance is for courts to safeguard the federalism aspect of Rule 23 by
insisting that "actions certified as settlement classes must meet the
same requirements under Rule 23 as litigation classes."273 In other
words, mass tort settlements could not be effected for classes that
would not pass muster under Rule 23 for purposes of actual litigation in a class action format.
This second, more stringent view would not foreclose the use of
the class action as a binding device for mass tort settlements, at
least where the court can discern a manageable number of patterns
in the applicable common law, such as would make viable a hypothetical trial.274 Even this limitation, however, may not be enough
to keep the federal courts from edging distressingly close to "mediation for[a]." It would be temptingly easy to conclude that a trial of
a nationwide mass tort class action would be workable when one
would not actually have to conduct such a proceeding.
In short, reliance upon private counsel as the architects of mass
tort settlements necessitates the use of a procedural mechanism
that could, in some situations, threaten institutional values that go
beyond the tort system. One, however, need not contort the jurisprudence of Rule 23 to effect a resolution of these questions. 21s If
anything, the foregoing observations highlight the need for an alternative mechanism with which to give binding effect to mass tort
settlements - specifically, a device that can draw upon the benefits
of private negotiations between experienced counsel but that does
not depend upon the invocation of Rule 23.
b. Personal Jurisdiction. Similar considerations also lie behind
the debate over the basis for personal jurisdiction in mass tort settlements.276 The debate centers upon the steps necessary as a matter of constitutional due process to bind the members of the
271. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
272. GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 799.
273. 55 F.3d at 799; see also Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 10, at 1456.
274. See GMC Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 799 (leaving open this possibility).
275. One possible statutory response would be for Congress to revise Rule 23 in order to
give explicit recognition to a lower legal standard for certification of settlement class actions.
276. No court has turned away a mass tort settlement on grounds of subject matter jurisdiction. See supra notes 113 (exposed but presently unimpaired persons have standing), 115
(prenegotiated settlement sufficient to constitute "case or controversy").
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plaintiff class to a privately generated regime - or, to put the point
conversely, the procedural limitations upon the extinguishment of
such persons' rights of action in tort through a judgment embodying
the class action settlement. Challenges along these lines tend to
arise not in the fairness hearing itself but afterward, when individual members of the plaintiff class who did not opt out under Rule
23(b)(3) seek to sue the settling defendants in tort. The basic pattern is for the district court to enjoin these state court tort actions to
protect its earlier judgment affording binding force to the settlement. The plaintiffs then challenge the injunction by arguing that
the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them in entering the settlement - specifically, that they lack minimum contacts with the
forum in which the court sits and that they did not otherwise consent to the court's jurisdiction. Indeed, such a challenge is currently
pending before the Third Circuit with respect to an injunction of
asbestos actions in state court brought against the defendants in the
Georgine settlement.277
Under current law, one confidently may say that such a collateral attack is not available to persons who had reason to be aware
of their past exposure and who received actual notice of the opportunity to opt out of the plaintiff class. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts,21s the Supreme Court squarely held that, at least with respect to known members of a plaintiff class, those who receive actual notice but who do not opt out will be considered to have
consented implicitly to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons.279 The affording of such notice will provide all the process
that is due as a constitutional matter.280 The open question today
concerns the extent to which Shutts applies beyond the parameters
of that case. The plaintiff class in Shutts consisted entirely of known·
plaintiffs - identified persons who owned certain royalty rights
against the defendant oil company.281 In finding implied consent in
that situation, the Court expressly declined to intimate a view about
personal jurisdiction in other types of class actions.282
By definition, unknown plaintiffs cannot be afforded the kind of
individualized mailing used to notify the royalty owners in Shutts.
277. See supra note 6.
278. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
279. See 472 U.S. at 811-14. The notion of implied consent in Shutts is not without its
critics. See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE LJ. 1, 16-19 (1986).
280. See 472 U.S. at 812.
281. See 472 U.S. at 799.
282. See 472 U.S. at 811 n.3.
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Nor are settling counsel likely to be in a position to prove conclusively that such persons received notice through other means, such
as the mass media, unions, or other intermediaries; indeed, as discussed earlier, one may best understand those devices to be directed more toward the generation of information in a notice-andcomment process than toward the affording of actual notice to individual class members. In addition, some commentators have
doubted the propriety of drawing an inference of consent when exposed persons - even if they receive actual notice - have yet to
ascertain whether they actually will become impaired.283 Finally, it
is conceivable that a plaintiff class in a mass tort settlement might
include at least some persons who do not even know that they have
been exposed to the substance at issue. Such is obviously not the
case with respect to breast implant recipients and probably not for
persons with occupational exposure to asbestos sufficiently extensive to cause an increased risk of future injury,284 but one nonetheless cannot exclude the possibility that the members of some future
plaintiff class may be unaware of their exposure.
The one decision to have addressed in any detail the applicability of Shutts to unknown mass tort plaintiffs - In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation (Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock
Chemicals Co. )285 - involved a collateral attack upon the settlement that concluded active class action litigation over Agent
Orange. There, the Second Circuit observed that " 'there was no
easily accessible list of veterans' " exposed to Agent Orange during
the Vietnam War, unlike the situation of the royalty holders in
Shutts. 286 Accordingly, as in the more recent agreements, notice of
the Agent Orange settlement "was provided to class members by
mail where feasible and by advertisements in the print and broadcast media."287 Nearly a decade after the settlement had received
judicial approval, however, certain veterans - who apparently had
not received individualized notice - sued in tort for injuries that
they alleged "did not manifest themselves or were not discovered"
283. See Koniak, supra note 228, at 1086-87.
284. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding
that "after more than 20 years of extensive litigation, over 15 bankruptcies (many with extensive notice), and massive publicity about asbestos, persons who have had occupational exposure to asbestos are aware of that exposure").
285. 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994).
286. 996 F.2d at 1435 (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 169
(2d Cir. 1987)).
287. 996 F.2d at 1429.
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until after the settlement date.288 Ivy, in short, presents the difficult
case of unknown plaintiffs with subsequently manifested injuries.
The Second Circuit recognized that the implied consent theory
of Shutts was inapplicable to these plaintiffs' collateral attack, but
the court nonetheless declined to limit the settlement only to those
veterans who had received individualized notice. Rather, the court
reasoned that:
In the instant case, society's interest in the efficient and fair resolution of large-scale litigation outweighs the gains from individual notice and opt-out rights, whose benefits here are conjectural at best....
[P]roviding individual notice and opt-out rights to persons who are
unaware of an injury would probably do little good. Their rights are
better served, we think, by requiring that "fair and just recovery procedures be[] made available to these claimants," ... and by ensuring
that they receive vigorous and faithful vicarious representation.289

Under this view, Shutts represents a rule of preference: for those
class members who can be identified, due process demands individualized notice. But this does not mean that the Due Process Clause
is violated when a court binds unknown plaintiffs to a settlement in
the absence of such notice. Rather, the process due to the latter
category of plaintiffs lies not in affording them the opportunity to
consent when they may not be in a position to make such a decision
but, instead, in judicial review of the settlement terms and .the process by which those terms were reached.
Although the Second Circuit thus purported to avoid reliance
upon the notion of implied consent in Shutts, the court's understanding of due process nonetheless involves the implication of consent in a deeper sense. The unarticulated subtext of Ivy seems to be
that, even when one cannot reliably draw an inference of consent
based upon inaction on the part of each individual class member a
la Shutts, one nonetheless may infer consent of a broader, Rawlsian
sort: if only it were possible for everyone to bargain in advance of a
mass tort - without anyone knowing his or her ultimate status as a
mass tort victim, a mass tortfeasor, or neither - then everyone
would consent to a system in which mass tort settlements could resolve the rights of unknown class members, with the assurance that
the courts will act as a check upon abuse by class counsel.2 90 Ivy, in
other words, rests upon a notion of implied consent not to a partic288. 996 F.2d at 1430.
289. 996 F.2d at 1435 (quoting 1 NEWBERG & CoNTE, supra note 124, § 1.23, at 1-56).
290. Cf. JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusncE 11-22 (1971) (positing such bargaining from
"the original position" as a criterion for justice).
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ular settlement but, instead, to a broader framework by which settlements may be reached in the mass tort area generally.
Whether this theory of consent ultimately would be enough to
satisfy constitutional due process is a matter I leave to others. My
point here is that the viability of mass tort settlements in the future
need not await the resolution of this question, just as it need not
await a solution to problems of class certification under Rule 23.
Rather than rely upon a court's guess about how people would bargain behind the proverbial veil of ignorance, there is a more reliable
means by which to approximate what such bargaining would produce: specifically, Congress should consider the possibility of building upon recent experience by developing a statutory regime for
mass tort settlement negotiations that is independent from Rule 23
but that provides for judicial review of any resulting agreements.
As a starting point for such discussions, I sketch a few suggestions
to guide this next step in the transformation from tort to
administration.
IV. AN

AGENDA FOR PUBLIC LAW

To say that Congress should develop a statutory regime for mass
tort settlements does not mean that it must replace private administrative compensation systems with a large scale public bureaucracy.
The rise of mass tort settlements, if anything, should serve as a rejoinder to claims that big problems in the law necessarily require
big government. Indeed, one of the significant attractions of private compensation systems designed on a tort-by-tort basis is that
they are less likely than public agencies to linger on for years after
accomplishment of their basic mission. Instead, the statutory regime that I envision would place the government not in the capacity
of dictating solutions to mass torts but, instead, in a role of facilitating private agreements to address such problems. The key is simply
to replace the binding device of a Rule 23 class action with Article I
regulatory authority.
Here, Congress should draw upon insights from the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 1990.2 91 The notion behind the Act is to provide an alternative to the conventional rulemaking process for pub291. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994). The Act developed from both academic commentary and
experimentation by rulemaking agencies. See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure For Malaise, 71 GEO. LJ. 1 (1982) (offering the earliest and most complete articulation
of the case for negotiated rulemaking); Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory
and Practice of Negotiated Ru/emaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985) (describing experimentation by EPA). For general background on the operation of the Act, see ADMINISTRA·
TIVE CONFERENCE OF TIIE U.S., NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (1990).
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lie administrative agencies. Specifically, the Act establishes a
framework for the formulation of agency rules through a process of
negotiation amongst those who would be affected thereby - both
regulated interests and regulatory beneficiaries - in order to avoid
the prospect of "expensive and time-consuming litigation" in court
over the validity of the final rule.292 In this regard, the Act is part
of the broader movement toward alternative dispute resolution in
the law as a whole - one that reflects the same sorts of dissatisfactions with traditional litigation as have become painfully evident in
the mass tort context.
For present purposes, the central concept of the Act is that an
administrative agency may discharge its rulemaking responsibilities
by focusing upon areas in which a "limited number of identifiable
interests" will be affected by a rule, by convening a committee of
persons who represent those interests, and by using the results of
the committee negotiations as the basis for issuance of an agency
rule for notice and comment.293 In its final form, a rule formulated
through negotiated rulemaking remains subject to judicial review in
the same manner as if it had resulted from conventional rulemaking
procedures under the APA.294
A similar approach in the mass tort area holds the promise of
retaining the benefits of private negotiation - experience in the
subject area and ready access to information on claim values in the
relevant mass tort stock market - while, at the same time, surmounting concerns of class certification and personal jurisdiction.
Specifically, a government agency might draw upon the results of
private negotiations - much like those that occurred over asbestos
and breast implants - to promulgate regulations that would establish a compensation program funded by defendants for persons injured by a particular mass tort.
Such a solution modeled after negotiated rulemaking need not
displace the status quo, wherein those who effect a mass tort settlement must deal with the doctrinal uncertainties of Rule 23. To the
contrary, the prospect that a government agency might find the
compensation terms formulated by private counsel to be unfair 292. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, §§ 2(2), (4), 104 Stat.
4969, 4969 (congressional findings).
293. See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a) (1994). The agency, of course, may draw upon the results of
the committee's negotiations only "to the maximum extent possible consistent with [its] legal
obligations." 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(7) (1994).
294. See 5 U.S.C. § 570 (1994) (providing that the negotiated rule "shall not be accorded
any greater deference by a court than a rule which is the product of other rulemaking
procedures").
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such that counsel would be consigned to pursue their deal, if at all,
through the more shaky device of Rule 23 - can serve to enhance
the constraints upon such counsel. If they want the additional
"bang" afforded by imprimatur of a regulatory agency, they will
need to persuade the agency about the virtues of the deal they have
wrought. And that would be all to the good.
To create such a framework, Congress would need to assert a
federal regulatory interest under the Commerce Clause over the
disposition of mass tort claims - even those that would not otherwise come within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. A
number of commentators previously have identified the need for
some form of national legislation to deal specifically with asbestos
litigation, without expressing any doubts about the legal basis for
such legislation.295 Moreover, pending bills that would impose federal statutory limitations upon product liability claims at common
law suggest that such federal intervention is no longer taboo as a
policy matter.296 If anything, the federal interest in mass torts is
significantly stronger: the barriers to consolidation of geographically dispersed claims for orderly resolution in a single proceeding
fairly cry out for a solution at the national level in much the same
way as the problems of interstate corporate activity demanded a
coordinated, national response earlier in this century. Indeed, the
assertion of federal authority that I envision would be tailored precisely to the federal interest in question: nondiverse tort cases in
the state courts would be affected only when necessary to facilitate
a binding national solution to a particular mass tort problem. In
short, the assertion of a federal regulatory interest over mass torts
would not implicate the current debate over the application of the
Commerce Clause to activities that do not substantially affect interstate commerce.297
As to the allocation of regulatory authority within the federal
government, Congress would be best served by preserving a degree
of flexibility. A mass tort centered upon a medical device like
breast implants appropriately might come within the expertise of
the FDA - the agency that originally licensed that product 295. See REHNQUIST COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 258, at 27-35; Lester Brickman,
The Asbestos Claims Management Act of 1991: A Proposal to the United States Congress, 13
CARDOZO L. REv. 1891 (1992); Edley & Weiler, supra note 52, at 397-401.
296. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposed Product Liability Fairness Act
of 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S6407 (daily ed. May 10, 1995).
297. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down a federal statute
criininalizing handgun possession within a school zone on the grounds that it was outside the
scope of the Commerce Clause).
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whereas a mass tort focused primarily upon the occupational setting, like asbestos, might call for the Department of Labor. To allow such matchmaking on a tort-by-tort basis, Congress might
simply delegate regulatory authority to the President, who in tum
could pass the baton to the appropriate agency as the circumstances
warrant.298
In addition, Congress would need to delineate a mechanism for
identification of mass torts that are potentially amenable to a negotiated solution at the national level. One possible solution would be
to draw upon recent experience with the MDL Panel - specifically, to predicate federal regulatory authority upon the existence
of a determination by that Panel to consolidate federal litigation
over a particular mass tort in a single forum. In essence, the MDL
Panel's determination would serve as an appropriate indication that
mass tort litigation in a particular area has progressed to a sufficient
degree to warrant consideration of a solution through the regulatory equivalent of a mass tort settlement. MDL consolidation thus
would form a necessary condition for agency action but would not
give rise to an affirmative requirement for the agency to convene a
negotiating committee. Rather, the agency still might exercise discretion as to whether displacement of tort litigation would be premature - for instance, due to problems of claim projection.
The prospect that a public agency will serve as the facilitator for
private negotiations can serve as a supplemental check upon agency
cost problems - one that remains free from the kinds of institutional self-interest to which courts might be susceptible. As under
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, the agency would have initial authority to select the negotiators to represent the various affected
interests. In the event of an impasse, the agency then could determine whether to press forward with some reconstituted subset of
the committee in order to surmount a holdout problem or, alternatively, to regard the particular impasse as a safeguard against a reverse auction. The task of distinguishing between the two situations
is a matter that might rest with the discretion of the agency on a
tort-by-tort basis.

298. The statutory scheme that I envision would not contravene the strictures of the
nondelegation doctrine upon the conferring of regulatory authority upon private parties. See
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-12 (1936) (striking down statute authorizing coal
companies and workers to set wage and hour regulations for their industry). As in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, the relevant public administrative agency would retain the ultimate
power to determine whether to issue as a binding regulation the compensation scheme developed by the negotiating committee. See Harter, supra note 291, at 107-09.
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Even when negotiations do bear fruit, the agency might make
use of the regulatory equivalent of a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out procedure. In this way, the prospect of continued litigation in the tort
system - in the event that large numbers of exposed persons regard the compensation terms in the negotiated rule as too stingy
and, accordingly, exercise their option to opt out - still can serve
as an important check upon the negotiation process fostered by the
agency in much the same way as it has done in the class action
context.
In framing the standards for judicial review of the resulting regulation, Congress might borrow the existing "arbitrary or capricious" standard of the APA, understood in light of hard look
jurisprudence. In this way, Congress simply would build upon existing law, albeit with an explicit grounding in principles of administrative law rather than the current incorporation of hard look
principles into Rule 23(e) sub silentio.
To say that an agency should issue regulations to create a compensation regime for particular mass torts is not to say that the
agency itself must also take on the day-to-day administration of that
regime. Rather, one might understand the agency regulations simply as defining a set of federal property rights for mass tort victims
as against mass tortfeasors - or, more accurately, of substituting
such rights, as defined in the regulations generated by the negotiating committee, for the plaintiffs' common law rights of action in
tort.299 Having detailed the compensation to be paid for particular
medical conditions, the agency need not involve itself in the adjudication of claims invoking those rights, at least as an initial matter.
Rather, the agency might retain oversight authority regarding the
compensation regime in the manner of an auditor, but it may leave
the routine administration of individual compensation claims in private hands, as in the asbestos and breast implant examples.
In short, future debate should .not frame the issues for public
lawmakers in terms of a stark choice between litigation-based solutions, on the one hand - whether of the traditional tort variety or
based upon Rule 23 class actions - and reliance entirely upon governmental solutions, on the other. Rather, Congress may build
upon the lessons of the recent mass tort settlement~ to fashion a
middle option, one that may capture the benefits of a privately negotiated and administered compensation regime but that relies
299. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (noting that "a chose in
action is a constitutionally recognized property interest").
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upon the regulatory authority of government for its binding force
and upon judicial review to guard against the problem of agency
costs. The objective, in other words, is to draw forth the unique
strengths of several different institutions - the private bar, public
agencies, and the courts - to fashion, in tandem with each other,
fair and workable solutions to mass torts.
CONCLUSION

The recent settlements for asbestos and breast implants represent a marked departure from previous efforts to adapt the common law litigation system to the phenomenon of mass torts. Rather
than tinker with the common law at the margins, the recent settlements posit the creation of distinctive new institutions to address
the equally distinctive features of mass torts. Though undoubtedly
novel in the area of tort law, these institutions bear striking similarities to public administrative agencies, both in their streamlined approach to compensation and in the agency cost problems that they
may engender.
In the immediate future, courts should organize their analysis of
mass tort settlements under Rule 23(e) along the lines of judicial
review in administrative law. Specifically, by insisting upon reasoned justification for the features of such settlements in the manner of hard look review over notice-and-comment rulemaking, the
courts can act as a check upon the agency costs that may arise from
the entrepreneurial interests of class counsel. In particular, hard
look review offers a solution superior to the regime of per se rules
suggested by commentators such as Professor Coffee.
More broadly, the recent settlements should serve as a predicate
for future elaboration by Congress in the form of a general statutory framework for the resolution of mass torts modeled upon the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act. In this way, Congress may take the
next step in the transformation from tort to administration.

